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STATEMENT OP PACTS
Reeves

contends

that Steinfeldt

selected portions of the record.

gleaned

the

facts

from

The fact of the matter is that

Reeves has failed to cite to the record.

Pursuant to Rule 24(e),

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party is required to refer to
the pages of the organized record. Therefore, Reeves7 statement of
the facts should be stricken and disregarded.
I.

ARGUMENT
STEINFELDT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OBJECTIONS TO
REEVES' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WERE PRE-JUDGMENT MOTIONS, AND DID NOT TOLL THE TIME TO
FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL.

Reeves

asserts

that

both

Steinfeldt's

Motion

for

Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law were motions under Rule 59, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and tolls the time to file the Notice of Appeal
under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

1

Reeves

confuses the issue of what motions toll the time to appeal, and
which do not.
A.

Generally,

Steinfeldt/s Motion To Reconsider Was A Prejudgment Request For The Court To Rethink Its
Memorandum Decision; And Does Not Fall Into A Rule
Which Tolls The Time To Appeal,
a trial court's jurisdiction

is divested

and

transferred to the appellate court when a notice of appeal is
filed. White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 629 (Utah 1990).

There are,

however, exceptions to the transfer of jurisdiction; and some
exceptions toll the time to file an appeal.
1.

Exceptions to the general rule
jurisdiction from the trial court.

divesting

The exception most pertinent to this case is under Rule 4 (b) ,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states in part:
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the
trial court . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend
. . . (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment;
or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such
motion.
The phrase "any other such motion" would entail any post judgment
motion which is in essence a mislabelled motion falling under Rule
4(a) , U* ah Rules of Appellate Procedure, (Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa
& Son. 308 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1991)); and would act as its
functional equivalent (See, Derrinqton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457

2

(Ut. App. 1991); Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 274 (Ut. App.
1993)) .
There are three (3) other exceptions from the principal that
the Notice of Appeal has in divesting jurisdiction from the trial
court.
First, a trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a motion
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, while an appeal is
pending to evaluate the motion more quickly and efficiently. White.
795 P.2d at 649-50; Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 757 P.2d 878, 880
(Ut. App. 1988).

Second, under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, when one party receives a judgment in a multi-party
action, the trial court retains jurisdiction over the remaining
parties, and is not effected by the appeal. White. 795 P.2d at 650.
Finally, under § 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANN., a trial court retains
jurisdiction to enforce or modify divorce proceedings to meet
continuing and changing needs and problems, even if an appeal of
the original order is pending. Peters v. Peters. 15 Ut.2d 413, 394
P.2d 71 (Utah 1964). These exceptions do not apply to Steinfeldt's
Motion for Reconsideration and cannot be characterized as falling
under Rule 60(b), Rule 54(b) or under § 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANN.

3

2.

Reeves

Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration is not
a post-judgment motion, and does not fall
under the 4(b) exception.

attempts

to characterize

Steinfeldt's

Motion

for

Reconsideration as a motion under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; and misrepresents to the court that Steinfeldt brought
the Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. There is no basis for Reeves to believe the Motion was
treated by the court, or intended to be, a Rule 59 Motion.

In

fact, Reeves attempts to interpret what the trial court thought by
the court's December 8, 1994 Memorandum Decision.

There is no

statement in the Memorandum Decision to indicate that the court
thought they were Rule 59 Motions. Steinfeldt's Motion was a prejudgment motion, and Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
only applies to post-judgment motions.

Under Utah case law,

Steinfeldt's Motion cannot be considered a Rule 59 Motion, as
stated in Ron Shepard Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650
(Utah 1994):
Rule 59, according to its plain language, applies only to
motions for new trials or amendments of judgments.
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis's
bench ruling was therefore not properly brought under
that rule since no signed order or judgment was ever
entered as a consequence of that ruling. There was no
order or judgment signed by Judge Lewis to be reviewed
under Rule 59.
Id. at 653-54 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Reeves also

states that Ron Shepard is a case under Rule 54, Utah Rules of
4

Civil Procedure, but Rule 54 is never mentioned in that case;
actually, Ron Shepard deals with the difference between a Rule 59
Motion and a Motion for Reconsideration of an oral decision prior
to a final order or judgment. Id.
addresses

the

issue

of

whether

In his Point I, Reeves also
Steinfeldt's

Motion

for

Reconsideration was the functional equivalent of a Rule 59 Motion.
Steinfeldt classified his Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to
Ron Shepard, which recognizes a party may request a Judge to
rethink a memorandum decision before entry of a final judgment (R.
237-47, Addendum 2).

The court in Ron Shepard held:

It is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess
its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order
or judgment. In the present case, because no final order
awarding defendants summary judgment was signed and
entered, the matter was still pending when plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration was filed in Judge Lewis's
court. She had every right to fully assess the matter
and, if deemed appropriate, to receive additional
evidence.
Id. at 654 (citation omitted). See also. Bennion v. Hansen. 799
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985).

Applying the Ron Shepard concept,

Steinfeldt asked the trial court to rethink its Memorandum Decision
of October 17, 1994 (The Ron Shepard case was decided 35 days prior
to the Motion for Reconsideration, on September 20, 1994).

As a

result, Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration cannot be deemed
the functional equivalent of a Rule 59 Motion; nor does it even
meet

the

criteria

under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules
5

of Appellate

Procedure, and Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as a postjudgment motion—and cannot be considered a Rule 59 Motion.
Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration is not a motion which
falls under any of the exceptions to divesting jurisdiction from
the trial court, specifically Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure; and does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal.
Because Steinfeldt's Motion did not toll the appeal period, it was
mandatory that Steinfeldt file his Notice of Appeal as he did.
Steinfeldt's Notice, therefore, was timely filed under Rule 4, Utah
Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure,

and

gives

this

Court

proper

jurisdiction to consider this case.
B.

Reeves
Proposed

Steinfeldt's
Objections
To
Reeves' Proposed
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, Was Not A
Post-Judgment Objection To The Final Judgment. And
Did Not Toll The Time For Steinfeldt To File A
Notice Of Appeal.
asserts

Findings

of

that
Fact

Steinfeldt's
and

Objections

Conclusions

of

to

Law,

Reeves'
were

an

equivalent Rule 59 or Rule 52 motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, the document itself shows that the Objections
were pre-judgment objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, albeit the Objections were chronologically
filed after the Judgment (R. 269-74, Addendum 3).
Reeves' proposed draft of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law sent to the Court were mailed to Steinfeldt on October 27,
6

1994 (R. 261, Addendum 4) ; and the Judgment, although signed by the
Judge on November 4, 1994, was not filed until November 7, 1994 (R.
266-68, Addendum 5).

Steinfeldt sent his Objections to Reeves'

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 8,
1994 (R. 269-74, Addendum 3).

It wasn't until November 9, 1994

that Notice of Judgment was sent from Reeves to Steinfeldt (R. 27879, Addendum 6) . This sequence of events created the chronology of
the Objections being filed after the written Judgment; however, it
is clear the Objections were pre-judgment because they questioned
Reeves7 Proposed Findings of Fact rather than the trial court7s
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment.

In

fact,

to

the

Objections

are

titled

"Defendant's

Objection

Plaintiffs7 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," and
refers to the Court7s Memorandum
Judgment (R. 269-74, Addendum 3).

Decision and not the final
Reeves wishes to alter the true

nature of the Objections because of chronology, but the Objections
are

clearly

pre-judgment.

Reeves

also

wants

to

impose

a

requirement upon Steinfeldt, and other losing parties, to call the
court each day to determine if the court has signed the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in order to avoid a "post-judgment
motion."
An illustrative case on this issue is Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660
P.2d 233 (Utah 1983).

In Kinkella, proposed Findings of Facts and
7

Conclusions of Law were signed by the trial court before the
plaintiff objected to the proposed findings. JEd. at 235.

The

Supreme Court held that although the Objections were filed later,
it was proper for the trial court to consider the Objections in
their proper context and then allow the signed Judgment to stand.
Id.

In the case at bar, the trial court considered Steinfeldt's

Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in its proper context (a pre-judgment motion) and allowed the
signed Judgment to stand; and this point is seen in the Memorandum
Decision of December 8, 1994, which states:
Defendant filed its Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 8,
1994. The Court having previously signed the Findings of
Fact and Judgment in this matter on November 4, 1994,
overrules the objection.
(R. 298, Addendum 7).

As a result, Steinfeldt's Objections to

Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not
a post-judgment motion in the context of Debrv v. Fidelity National
Title

Insurance

Co. . 828 P.2d

520

(Ut. App.

recognizes that what controls a motion

1992).

Debrv

(or objection) is its

substance (Id. at 523); and substantively, Steinfeldt's Objections
were pre-judgment objections. The period in which Steinfeldt could
file

his

Notice

of

Appeal,

therefore,

was

not

tolled;

and

Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal was timely under Rule 4, Utah Rules

8

of Appellate Procedure, and gives this Court proper jurisdiction to
consider this case,
C.

Steinfeldt's Notice Of Appeal Is Valid.
1.

Because

the

Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and
Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were effectively
denied.
nature

of

both

Steinfeldt's

Motion

for

Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were pre-judgment actions, the trial court's
later written Judgment of November 4, 1994 and decision to allow
the written Judgment to stand was determinative.

The Motion for

Reconsideration was directed at the earlier Memorandum Decision,
and the Objections were directed at Reeves' Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law; and the written Judgment effectively
denied

the

Motion,

and

overruled

and

the

Objections.

The

Memorandum Decision of December 8, 1994 and written Order of
January 3, 1995 regarding exclusively the Motion and Objections
which followed the written Judgment of November 4, 1994 were
cursory, and merely reiterated the actions of the Court at the time
of the written Judgment of November 4, 1994.
Steinfeldt's

Notice

of

Appeal

was

timely

As a result,

because

a

final

determination was made at the time of the written Judgment on
November 4, 1994 was signed and filed with the trial court.

9

2.

The trial court was divested of jurisdiction
to
make
the
written
Order
regarding
Steinfeldt/s Motion for Reconsideration and
Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Once a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court is
divested of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is transferred to the
appellate court. White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990). As
a result, as of December 27, 1994, the trial court was divested of
jurisdiction by Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal.

The trial court,

therefore, had no jurisdiction to enter the written Order denying
Steinfeldt's

Motion

for

Reconsideration

and

overruling

the

Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
3.

This Court should not hold that Steinfeldt's
Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to
Reeves' Proposed
Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are Rule 59 or 52 motions,
as the record does not support such a holding.
Such a characterization would work an extreme
inequity on Steinfeldt.

For the court to rule that a motion or objection is basically
a Rule 59 or Rule 52 motion which tolls the time to file an appeal
under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, creates an
extreme difficulty for litigants.
For example, a party may file a motion to reconsider intending
a Rule 59 or 52 motion which will toll the time to file a notice of
appeal, and the party does not file such notice; however, the
10

appellate court determines it is not a Rule 59 or Rule 52 motion
and the party could not, therefore, make a timely notice of appeal
because no tolling occurred.

Or, a party files a motion to

reconsider intending to ask a judge to rethink an oral decision,
and the party then files a notice of appeal because the earlier
motion would not toll the time for the notice; but then, the
appellate court decides the motion is in fact a Rule 59 or Rule 52
motion—which tolls the time to appeal—and the party is unaware of
how the court treated the motion. Again, a party could not make a
timely notice of appeal because the notice was filed too early.
The uncertainty of such a ruling as to whether it is a Rule 59 or
Rule 52 motion which is not designated by the movant under such
rules makes it impossible for a party to proceed with knowledge
that the rights to appeal have been preserved.

It would be

difficult for a party to proceed. Filing two (2) notices of appeal
in all cases may be the only alternative.

A party would be

incurring expenses by filing multiple appeals and such a notion
violates the scope of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to "secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Rules of Civil

Procedure are to assist in the proceedings, not be a land mine for
the litigant.

11

In this case, Steinfeldt intended the motion and objections to
be pre-judgment and which would not toll the time to appeal; and
they were never intended as Rule 59 or Rule 52 motions.

His

actions in filing the Notice of Appeal confirm such understanding.
To determine the motions were something other than what Steinfeldt
filed and designated as pre-judgment filings would work inequity
and injustice to Steinfeldt, and all similarly situated parties.
As a result, the Court should determine that Steinfeldt's Motion
and Objections were not Rule 59 and Rule 52 motions, and were prejudgment motions not tolling the time file a notice of appeal.
D.

In The Alternative. Steinfeldt's Notice Of Appeal
Should Be Treated As Deferred Or Suspended Until
The January 3. 1995 Written Order.

In the alternative, if the Court determines that Steinfeldt's
Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are Rule 59 or Rule 52
motions, then Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal should be deferred or
suspended until the January 3, 1995 written Order denying the
Motion and overruling the Objections. Even if Steinfeldt's Motion
and Objections are Rule 59 or Rule 52 motions, they were still prejudgment motions and Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and Reeves' cited authority regarding Rule 4(b) and its effect do
not apply.

As distinguished, Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal would

simply be considered filed on January 3, 1995 at the same time the
12

Court made its formal written Order regarding Steinfeldt's Motion
for Reconsideration and Objections.
II.

STEINFELDT DID NOT PARTIALLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO FILE A
MECHANIC'S LIEN NOTICE BECAUSE SUCH ALLEGED WAIVER WAS
NOT CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

Reeves argues that Steinfeldt has confused a waiver of a right
to a mechanic's lien notice with a limited impairment to file a
mechanic's lien at a particular time. However, it is Reeves who is
trying to muddle the meaning of a waiver.
A.

Steinfeldt Allegedly Waived An Existing Right In
Time To File A Mechanic's Lien Notice.

At issue is whether Steinfeldt made a partial waiver by
contract to his right in time to file a mechanic's lien notice by
signing the August 9, 1993 Agreement.

Reeves has used the terms

waiver, partial waiver, limited waiver, and modification of a
right; and Reeves can certainly choose to use the term limited
impairment, and has also used the term modification.

The bottom

line is Steinfeldt challenges the trial court's decree that the
written agreement, "superseded the defendant's general right to
claim a lien and constituted a limited lien waiver. (R. 266-68,
Addendum 5) (emphasis added). In other words, Steinfeldt could not
contractually waive, partially waive, impair, or otherwise modify
his rights to file a mechanic's lien until a particular time
because the limited waiver was not expressed in the contract, and
it was not clear or unambiguous. To put it another way, Steinfeldt
13

had a right to file a mechanic's lien notice.

A contractual

obligation to file a mechanic's lien notice at a later time would
then waive an existing right of Steinfeldt to file the statutory
lien (albeit the waiver would be partial, impaired, or otherwise a
limited waiver to time only)•

As a waiver of an existing right,

therefore, there must be clear and unambiguous language in the
contract for the waiver to be effective (See, Appellant's Brief,
Point I.A.).
B.

The

Steinfeldt's Alleged Waiver Was Not Clear
Unambiguous, Or Even An Express Term Of
Parties' Agreement.

issue of whether

the partial waiver was

And
The

clear and

unambiguous is basically ignored by Reeves, and tentatively argued
in a footnote.

Reeves refutes the issue by saying Steinfeldt7s

cited cases dealt with total waivers, and in this case there is
only a limited waiver

(see discussion above).

This argument

ignores the standard of waiving an existing right (the right to
file a mechanic's lien notice at a certain time) as established in
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).
In Reeves' Brief they state that "Steinfeldt contracted to fix
the

date

on which

he could

(Appellees Brief at 10) .

file

a

lien—the

closing

date"

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MENTION, OR

EXPRESSED TERMS, REGARDING A LIEN OR A LIMIT TO FILING A MECHANIC'S
LIEN NOTICE IN THE AUGUST 9, 1993 AGREEMENT.
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Payment for work is

mentioned, payment at closing of the house is mentioned, fees and
wages are mentioned, and a previous fee is mentioned; but, there is
nothing expressed or implied which refers to Steinfeldt delaying
the time in which he could file his mechanic's lien notice (R.
217—Plaintiff's Exhibit "1," Addendum 8). There is no reference
to a waiver of the right to file a lien which is the only security
a contractor has in improving the owner's property.

Reeves

suggests no such express term is needed and there are no Utah cases
on

point

regarding

unambiguous waivers.

mechanic's

lien

notices

and

clear

and

Reeves blatantly ignores Steinfeldt's cases

on point: Neiderhauser Builders & Development Corp. v. Campbell,
824 P.2d 1192 (Ut. App. 1992); Project Unlimited. Inc. v. Copper
State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990); and Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Stevens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977); and suggests
that Mine and Smelter Supply Co. v. General Insurance Co. of
America, 471 P.2d 154 (Utah 1970) is not on point because of "an
incredible latent ambiguity."

However, Reeves misses the point

that although a contract may appear clear and unambiguous, a latent
defect will create the ambiguity—and a waiver will have no effect.
In this case, the contract appears clear and unambiguous regarding
payment; but there is no mention of a lien, or a limited lien
waiver, and as a result there can be no clear or unambiguous
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limited

waiver

regarding

Steinfeldt's

statutory rights to be

secured for his work.
Reeves' counsel goes as far as suggesting that Steinfeldt's
position would basically require a copy of the mechanic's lien
statutes to be included with any contract regarding a waiver.
Steinfeldt's

position

does

not

suggest

anything

so drastic;

however, a contract which waives or partially waives a right should
at least mention which right is being waived.

In this case, there

is no such expressed term to suggest Steinfeldt is waiving or
partially waiving any rights.
III. THERE IS NO STATUTORY PRECLUSION TO STEINFELDT PILING A
MECHANIC'S LIEN NOTICE EARLY.
ALSO, SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLETION OP WORK DOES NOT MEAN CLOSING, AND STEINFELDT
FILED HIS NOTICE AFTER SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION OF WORK.
Reeves next suggests that not only does the contract limit the
time in which Steinfeldt could file a mechanic's lien notice, but
asserts that statutorily Steinfeldt could not file a mechanic's
lien

notice

until

Reeves'

closing—because

closing

equals

substantial completion, and a person cannot file the notice until
after substantial completion.
First, the mechanic's lien statutes do not say that a lien
notice "may not be filed" until substantial completion of work, as
Reeves has stated. In fact, the statute sets forth a limitation to
file a lien notice—eighty (80) days after substantial completion,
and beyond eighty (80) days there is no longer any right to file a
16

mechanic's lien.

Contrary to Reeves' argument about the statute

setting up a "window" in which to file a lien beginning at the time
of substantial completion, and unsupported by Reeves.
As far back as 1893 the Utah Supreme Court was dealing with
the issue of mechanic's liens.

The 1890 statute is cited in

Morrison v. Carev-Lombard Co. , 9 Ut.2d 20, 33 P. 238 (1893), and
many of the sections of the present code are very similar to the
1890 code. The court interpreted Section 1, which is similar to §§
38-1-2 and 38-1-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1993), as follows:
From the day the contractor commences to work or furnish
materials it is notice to all persons thereafter
contracting with the owner that the property is burdened
with a lien, and, if there were no further enactment,
then there could be no question about the notice or the
time of the attachment of the lien, nor of the persons
entitled thereto.
Id. at 25.
The

court continued

in determining

the creation

of the

mechanic's lien by stating:
It is evident that the filing of the statement does not
create the lien, for the language of the statute is, "Any
party claiming a lien shall file," etc., but simply holds
it or keeps it in force for the time of one year, as
provided in Section 21 of the same act, so as to give the
claimant an opportunity to enforce the same by process of
law.
Id. at 25.
The Reeves want to contend that the contractor has a narrow
"window" in which to file the lien, and that Steinfeldt did not
17

have the right to file the lien until after payment was due.

The

Morrison court dealt with a similar argument by counsel when he
£ried to read the statute as a requirement of filing the Notice.
Counsel for appellant contend that the word "may," in the
expression "may file in the office," etc., should be
construed "shall." If this theory were correct, then the
effect would be that no lien of a sub-contractor would
attach until the statement provided for in this section
were filed. This might, and in many cases doubtless
would, render nugatory the provisions in the first
section of the act that the claimant shall have a lien
"to the extent of the interest or claim of such owner
thereto at the time of the commencement to do such work
or to furnish such materials," . . .
* * *

The claimant may avail himself of it or not, as he
chooses. If he does not, it will in no way interfere
with his lien, which attaches when he commences to do
work or furnish materials.
Id. at 78-79.
Additionally, the court spoke of the ability of the owner to
impair the contractors rights:
This section provides in express terms that all such
liens shall attach at the time the performance of the
contract commenced; and again it provides that valid
encumbrances upon such land, made and recorded before
that time, shall not be impaired, this clearly indicating
that no act which the owner may thereafter do shall
injuriously affect the lien of the claimant on the
property.
Id. at 29.
The last important holding from the Morrison case is the lien
is lost if not filed within the time frame.
18

After the work is completed or the materials are
furnished the line may be lost by a failure to file the
statement provided in section 10 within the time allowed
in section 11, or by a failure to foreclose within the
time as limited in this act; but unless there is such
failure, or a payment of the claim, the property will be
burdened with the lien, subject to prior encumbrances
with which the property was burdened when the performance
of the contract was commenced, or when the statement
under section 12 was filed.
Id. at 80.
As can be seen, Reeves' arguments are totally without merit.
A lien can be filed at any time after the contractor commences work
on the project.
Reeves' position also ignores the issue that courts will
liberally construe the mechanic's lien statutes, and will construe
these statutes in favor of lien claimants. Interiors Contracting v.
Smith, Hollander, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Ut. App. 1992). Also, Reeves
ignores the issue that filing a mechanic's lien notice prior to
substantial completion of work makes no effective difference than
a similar filing during the eighty (80) days after substantial
completion.

The fact that Reeves cited Interiors is surprising.

The issues in that case dealt with the fact that one of the parties
filed a lien after the 100 days had run.

Reeves also argues that

if the 80-day window did not exist, that there would never be
arguments over substantial completion.

Interiors is the perfect

example of the argument which arises from substantial completion.
A contractor files the lien late and is then intending to extend
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the substantial completion date.

According to § 38-1-5, UTAH CODE

ANN. (1993) , a mechanic's lien relates back to the commencement of
work being done, and the priority is unaffected if the lien is
filed one (1) day or eighty (80) days after substantial completion
of work.

The effect is the same if the lien notice is filed prior

to substantial completion of work because the priority remains the
same, and there is no prejudice to another because property
subjected to a lien must deal with the lien in any of the above
situations.

The "window" which is created by the statute is the

"window" from first day of work to 80 days after substantial
completion; not as Reeves stated from substantial completion to 80
days.
Further, Reeves' position would place an undue burden on subcontractors to constantly be concerned with waiting for substantial
completion

of work to occur to finally trigger the supposed

"window" in order to a file mechanic's line notice.
instances, the project may be of substantial length.

In many
The first

sub-contractors are not required by the statute, as Reeves would
like to impose, to constantly monitor the progress in order to file
during Reeves' "window."

The requirement of Reeves works an undue

burden and requirement upon contractors to factually determine
substantial

completion.

If

the

trier

of

fact

determines

"substantial completion" had not occurred when contractor filed the
20

lien, the lien is invalid under Reeves' agreement. If on the other
hand the trier of fact determines that substantial completion was
earlier then what contractor determines, yet contractor held off on
filing the lien because of the fear of filing too early, contractor
has lost the statutory right.

A series of traps and pitfalls for

the contractor is not the intention of the statute. The intention
is to protect the materialman who adds value to an

owner's

property. Reeves' position cannot be supported, and equity favors
Steinfeldt on this issue.
Second, Reeves gives no basis for the assumption that closing
on a home is the same as substantial completion of work.

In fact,

Reeves down-plays Steinfeldt's hypothetical that a crafty document
could delay closing beyond eighty
completion

of work because closing

substantial completion.
their

argument,

and

(80) days from substantial
is allegedly the same as

Reeves' own cited case is contrary to
Steinfeldt7s

shows

hypothetical

is very

possible and highly probable. In Daniels v. Desert Federal Savings
and

Loan,

771 P.2d

1100

(Ut. App.

1989), the plaintiff had

contracted to perform work for a development in Park City, and
completed construction by July, 1981. Id. at 1101. The defendant,
who loaned money for the development, completed closing on the
property by a Deed of Trust executed on February 22, 1982 and
recorded on March 1, 1982. Id.

("Closing" is defined as "the final
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steps of the transaction whereat the . . . mortgage is secured,
deed

is

delivered

or

placed

in

Dictionary. 231 (5th ed. 1979)).

escrow,

etc."

Black/s

Law

The plaintiff in Daniels was

going to file a lien on the property after completing construction,
but was induced not to file with a promise of payment. Daniels. 771
P.2d at 1101.
over

one

The court held that because the plaintiff waited

hundred

(100)

days

to

file

after

completing

construction, the filing was untimely. Id. at 1102.

the

In other

words, substantial completion begins when construction ends (even
if trivial or minor work still needs to be completed) , and not when
closing is complete.

Also, it is possible to induce a laborer to

wait beyond the statutory period and prevent the filing of a lien
notice, even though closing has not

occurred.

It would be

inequitable, therefore, to allow parties to contract around the
eighty (80) days—and prevent any possibility of filing a statutory
mechanic's lien right without the party expressly waiving the
right.
Although

Steinfeldt

could

have

filed

the

lien

earlier,

Steinfeldt, filed his mechanic's lien notice after substantial
completion of work.

Steinfeldt was asked to stop work on November

5, 1993, when final completion of construction was contemplated;
and Steinfeldt worked until November 3, 1993
Addendum 9).

(R. 466, 503-05,

On November 5, 1993, Steinfeldt filed his mechanic's
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lien notice after substantial completion occurred (R. 444, 469,
488-89, Addendum 10, R. 217—Plaintiffs' Exhibit "2,", Addendum
11) .

The two (2) days in which Steinfeldt did not work only

involved trivial jobs, and would hardly prevent an action by
Steinfeldt for payment because of lack of claiming substantial
performance. See, Interiors Contracting v. Smith, Hollander. 827
P.2d 963, 966, and n. 4 (Ut. App. 1992).

In fact, the Court

awarded Steinfeldt the entire contract less some minimal offsets.
Also, the $1,503.00 worth of work done by Reeves after November 3,
1993 to complete the construction represents only .00237% of the
$550,000.00 value of house constructed by Steinfeldt
Addendum 12) .

(R. 118,

Such a disparity shows, as a matter of law, that

substantial completion of the work occurred prior to Steinfeldt
filing his mechanics lien notice. Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Ut.2d 136,
506 P. 2d 60

(Utah 1973) (where .0011385% of uncompleted work

compared to the total value of completed work, was trivial as a
matter of law).
Again, the use of Interiors by Reeves is surprising.

In

footnote 4, the case of Palombi v. D&C Builders, Inc., 22 Ut.2d
297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969) is cited where the Court of Appeals
paraphrases the case in holding "work consisting of obtaining a
building permit and removing building materials from the work site
is insufficient to extend the filing period." Id. at 327.
23

As in

the case at bar, the Reeves' only work was attempting to obtain the
final inspection.
Reeves

cannot,

therefore,

maintain

the

argument

that

substantial completion of work is the same as closing. Closing has
nothing to do with the statute or ability of Steinfeldt to file the
lien.

Reeves' argument is invalid and has no application to the

facts of the case in any event.
IV.

OVERSTATEMENT OP PEES CANNOT BE A WRONGFUL MECHANIC'S
LIEN NOTICE.

Reeves continues to assert that the mechanic's lien notice
filed by Steinfeldt was wrongful and a breach of the agreement
because it overstated the fees due to Steinfeldt. Reeves does not
acknowledge that there is no requirement to list the amount of the
lien on the notice. See, § 38-1-7, UTAH CODE ANN. (1993).

Listing

fees (whether over or understated) cannot constitute a wrongful
filing if it is not required.

Further, the purpose of the

mechanic's lien notice is to inform interested parties of the
lien's existence.

In essence, Steinfeldt provided all of the

required information to inform interested parties that he had a
lien against the property.
Reeves.

Such information could not prejudice

Reeves wants to combine the agreement and the mechanic's

lien notice and say any deviation in the notice constitutes a
wrongful action and a breach.

The facts are that the mechanic's

lien notice is a separate document serving a separate purpose; and
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overstated fees on the notice has (if they be such) , at best, a de
minimis

effect.

Reeves' position, therefore, is incorrect that

overstated fees listed in the notice was wrongful conduct.
V,

THE AMENDED MECHANIC'S LIEN NOTICE WAS AN EFFECTIVE CURE.

Reeves claims that Steinfeldt's amended mechanic's lien notice
was not an effective cure because the notice still overstated the
fees.

However, as discussed above, the notice is a separate

document serving a separate purpose. The amount of the lien is not
even required to be listed on the notice. § 38-1-7, UTAH CODE ANN.
(1993) . Therefore, the purported overstated fees would not prevent
the amended notice to cure any alleged prior defect.
Reeves also say there is no authority to allow an amended
notice to cure a prior defect; on the other hand, no authority
suggests Reeves' position is correct. It is this reason Steinfeldt
questions the trial court's decision not to rule on this issue, and
asks this court to rule the amended notice was an effective cure of
any purported defect. The amended lien maybe constructed as a new
timely filed lien.
Next, Reeves suggest the amended notice would not cure the
damages resulting from the earlier filing.

But this position is

unfounded, and Reeves ignores Steinfeldt's arguments. Reeves seem
to change their position that Steinfeldt had absolutely no right to
file his mechanic's lien notice.
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There can be no damages from an

earlier filing of the Notice because either way the lien was on the
Reeves' property from the commencement of work, and Reeves would
have

,f

to deal" with the lien in any event (See. Supra Point III) .

Whether Steinfeldt filed earlier on the first day work commenced,
or on the last day that filing is possible, the lien still relates
back to the first day work began.

Reeves can show no unique

"damages" because of any early filing if a later filing would have
the exact same affect.

Therefore, an amended lien filed within

Reeves' desired "window" would effectively cure any alleged defect
because the unique damages would not exist.
Finally, Reeves stated the amended filing would do nothing
because Reeves had not accepted Steinfeldt's work.

This issue

however, is a "red herring" since acceptance of work is not a
condition of a valid lien and irrelevant. Morrison v. Carey-Lombard
Co.f 9 Ut.2d 20, 33 P. 238 (1893).

There is no indication Reeves

did not accept Steinfeldt's work and only trivial items were
performed by Reeves (R. 217—Plaintiffs' Exhibit "14," 400-411,
416-18, Addendum 13).

Steinfeldt was not asked to redo or repair

any work performed; and Reeves was apparently satisfied with the
work by proceeding to the closing.

Also, Steinfeldt's work

constituted substantial performance of his agreement; and what
trivial work was

left would not allow Reeves to not accept

Steinfeldt's performance

(See, Supra, Point
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III).

A

formal

acceptance by Reeves is irrelevant, since the amended notice is not
affected by acceptance•
VI.

STEINPELDT IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.

Reeves argues Steinfeldt has waived his right to interest
because nothing more about interest was asked by Steinfeldt other
than from the counterclaim.

Reeves ignores the closing arguments

by counsel, which states:
[Steinfeldt] is entitled to his
matter as a result of 38-1-18 and
lien. He is also entitled to the
November 5. 1993, until the date

attorney fees in this
the foreclosure of his
cost and interest from
of this judgment.

(R. 529, Addendum 14) (emphasis added).
his right to prejudgment interest.

Steinfeldt did not waive

The right to interest is

created by statute when a debt is incurred. § 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN.
(1993).
Reeves also states the amount of damages were undetermined,
and therefore, interest is improper. Reeves position is wrong for
two (2) reasons.
determined.

First, the amount due to Steinfeldt was clearly

The Findings of Fact state:

The amounts due defendant under the terms of the
agreement, but for his breach thereof are $10,000 plus
$1.080 for unpaid supervisory fees.
(R.

261-65, Addendum

4)

(emphasis

added).

The

amount due

Steinfeldt was never disputed according to the contract, only the
offset amounts claimed by Reeves.

As an undisputed figure,

Steinfeldt is due ten percent (10%) interest on the $10,000 and
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$1,080 amounts from the day of closing, minus any offsets Reeves
are due.
Second, Reeves' cited case law deals with undetermined damages
and interest. However, § 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN., deals with interest
due on monies owed bv contract.

This is not a case determining

unknown medical expenses or unknown liability as being reasonable
and necessary, but a case of contract payment and interest on
unpaid amounts.

In Corina v. Wilcox. 267 Utah Adv. Rpt. 40, 44

(Utah 1995), it states: "without any clear factual information
plaintiffs' damages could not be measured by xfacts and figures' or
*calculated with mathematical accuracy'11 See, Canyon County Store
v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414
statutory ten percent

(Utah 1989).

Steinfeldt is due his

(10%) interest on the amount Reeves was

obligated to pay at the day of closing because

it could be

calculated with "facts and figures."
VII. STEINFELDT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES.
Reeves contends Steinfeldt cannot claim attorneys fees because
Reeves was awarded offsets to Steinfeldt's outstanding debt, and
therefore, cannot be a prevailing party.
Reeves ignores their own contentions from the case, because
they question whether Steinfeldt
example:
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should be paid

at all; for

The origin of the dispute centered on whether Steinfeldt
had completed the job and so it was disputed whether the
entire $10,000 fee enumerated in the contract was due,
(Response Brief of Appellees. 17) (emphasis added). When the trial
court made its decision, Steinfeldt was awarded what was due to him
by the agreement—$10,000 and $1,080 for the service, minus offsets
to Reeves ($1,503). (See also. Memorandum Decision of October 17,
1994, which states:

"Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the

amended contract which he entered into with Plaintiffs . • .
Defendant is entitled to the $10,000 under the contract, $300
weekly contractor's fee, and $20 per hour for any extras, [minus
offsets]." (R. 236, Addendum 15)).
Reeves own cited case shows this award to Steinfeldt made
Steinfeldt the prevailing party:
Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for
purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple
. . . However, this simple analysis cannot be employed here
because both plaintiff and defendant obtained some monetary
relief against the other. Our review of the relevant case law
convinces us that under the provision at issue, there can be
only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and
defendant are awarded money damages on claims arising from the
same transaction . . .
We hold that in the present
circumstances the party in whose favor the "net" judgment is
entered must be considered the "prevailing party" and is
entitled to an award of its fees.
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56
(Ut. App. 1989)

(footnotes omitted)

(citations omitted).

applying this holding, the court continued:
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In

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that [defendant], in
view of its net recovery of approximately $85,000.00, is
the sole "prevailing party" as a matter of law. . . .
[Defendant], while not enjoying total success on this
appeal, is clearly the "prevailing party," and is
entitled on remand to an award, of its attorney fees
. . . The thrust of [plaintiff's] petition is that it must be
held the prevailing party since it only claimed all along that
it was entitled to some offset, in an amount to be proven, and
ultimately proved it was entitled to an offset. . . . In this
case, we remain convinced that application of the net judgment
rule does not distort the relative success of the parties at
trial . . . Viewed in any sensible way, [defendant] prevailed
below and was entitled to the award of a reasonable attorney
fee as the prevailing party.
Id. at 556-59 (emphasis added) .
Neale.

The case at bar is similar to

Reeves seeks to pay nothing, or at least payment minus

offsets, and Steinfeldt seeks payment on a contract. Not counting
the awarded attorneys fees, Reeves was awarded offsets of $1,503.00
and Steinfeldt was awarded $9,577.00 ($10,000.00 plus $1,080.00
minus $1,503.00).

As a matter of law, Steinfeldt received the

greater net judgment, and as the prevailing party is entitled to
attorneys fees under § 38-1-18, UTAH CODE ANN. (1993).
RESPONSE BRIEF OP CROSS-APPELLEE
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4
The text of said statute is set forth in Addendum 1, attached
hereto.
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE
Steinf eldt does not disagree with the statement of the case as
set forth in Reeves' Cross-Appeal brief, with the exception that
the trial court basically ruled in favor of Steinfeldt to recover
the amount due to Steinfeldt by contract, with offset amounts to
Reeves.
STATEMENT OF PACTS
Steinfeldt does not disagree with the statement of the facts
as set forth in Reeves' Cross-Appeal brief, with the exception that
evidence presented at trial regarding the costs of escrowing monies
by Reeves was speculative and confusing; whereas, the delay in
closing costs were more determinative.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Reeves filed an untimely notice of cross-appeal in

violation of Rule 4(a) , and (d) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A final Judgment was signed on November 4, 1994; and motions filed
subsequent to the final Order did not toll the time period to file
a notice of appeal under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
II.
Reeves

It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to award

$403.00

in escrow

costs when the

$403.00 figure was

adequately ascertainable, and the $1,842.00 figure was a guess, and
unascertainable by testimony or evidence.
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ARGUMENT
I.

REEVES FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY CROSS-APPEAL.

Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states that a
cross-appeal must be filed:
Within 14 days after the date on which the first notice
of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this Rule, whichever
period last expires.
(emphasis added).

Rule 4(a) states in part:

The notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (emphasis added). The
judgment from which Reeves takes this cross-appeal was signed
November, 1994 (R. 266-68, Addendum 5 ) ; and Steinfeldt filed a
Notice of Appeal on December 27, 1994 (R. 305-06, Addendum 16),
pursuant to an extension of time granted by the trial court.
Reeves filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 11, 1995: 68 days
after the date of entry of the judgment appealed from; and 15 days
after Steinfeldt filed the Notice of Appeal (R. 312-13, Addendum
17).

Moreover,

application

of

a

3-day

mailing

period

is

inappropriate for an entry of a notice of appeal. State v. Palmer,
777 P.2d 521, 522 (Ut. App. 1989).

As a result, Reeves7 Notice of

Cross-Appeal was untimely and must be dismissed.
Reeves contends that the entry of the Judgment from which
Reeves appeals was the written Order which denied Steinfeldt '& pre32

judgment

Motion

for

Reconsideration,

and

which

overruled

Steinfeldt's pre-judgment Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

However, the pre-judgment Motion

and Objections did not toll the time period in which to file a
notice

of

appeal

Procedure.

The

under
issue

Rule

4(b), Utah

regarding

Rules

Steinfeldt's

of

Appellate

Motion

for

Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law is discussed and fully briefed in the body
of Steinfeldt's Reply Brief to the Response Brief of Reeves, and
incorporated and made a part of this argument herein by this
reference.
Because the time to appeal was not tolled by Steinfeldt's
Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the entry of the Judgment
from which Reeves wishes to appeal was on November 4, 1994. As a
result, Reeves7 Notice of Cross-Appeal was untimely and must be
dismissed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $403.00 FOR DAMAGES AND COSTS
OF ESCROWING WAS NOT ERRONEOUS BECAUSE SUCH DAMAGES WERE
ASCERTAINABLE; WHEREAS, OTHER INDICATIONS OF COSTS WERE
A GUESS AND CONFUSING.

Reeves contends that evidence and testimony at trial regarding
the interest costs of escrowing funds was "clearly11 $1,842.20 and
the trial court7s award was clearly erroneous in refusing to use
such figure in Reeves7 damages. However, examining the marshalled
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evidence by Reeves shows the trial court's decision was not clearly
erroneous.
The $403.00 was interest costs by a delay in closing/ and such
figures seems to be derived from an ascertainable computation.
the examination

of Shawn Reeves

(Reeves7

marshalled

In

evidence

paragraph 9), Mr. Reeves explained the $403.00 figure as follows:
Q.

And have you then attempted to calculate the interest
differential between the amount that you had financed on
your construction loan at the construction loan rate
compared to the same amount at the long-term financing
rate for those ten days that you were delayed in closing?

A.

Yes, we have. And the one was a base plus two, which
would be six plus two was eight. And our long-term was
four and an eighth. The eight days of interest came to
approximately $403.

(R. 396, Addendum 18). However, other interest costs for escrowing
monies was at best a guess by Reeves.

Arriving at the $1,842.00

figure, Mr. Reeves states the following:
Q.

With respect to the cost of having to escrow the money at
Security Title Company, have you attempted to calculate
that based on Exhibit No. 20?

A.

Yes, we have. This was a little more confusing because
it's a variable rate signature loan and every month the
rate can change. And it goes anywhere from 12.9 to 13.9
to 14.6. Just taking an average and estimating it, it
came out to about $1,842.20, the finance charges we've
paid.

Q.

Now that's just what you paid to Security Pacific;
correct?

A.

Yes. We made $330 payments each month, the minimum. So
some of that went to principal which made it even less,
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and the rest went to principal too and the rest went for
finance charges,
(R. 396-97, Addendum 19) (emphasis added). Testimony of Mr. Reeves
also shows Reeves received a $7,800.00 refund of the escrowed
monies about March of 1994 (R. 423-24, Addendum 20); and shows that
Reeves had

already

set

aside the

$10#000.00

fee payable to

Steinfeldt (R. 424-25, Addendum 21).
Further, Reeves' trial Exhibit No. 20, bank statements of a
loan, are not complete (R. 217—Plaintiffs' Exhibit "20," Addendum
22) .

The statements do not show what percentage of each payment

was for principal or interest, two (2) monthly statements are
missing, and most of the statements occur after Reeves received the
refunded monies from the escrow in March, 1994.
As a result, the calculation of interest costs was confusing,
unascertainable, and at best a guess. The Court did not know the
exact rates charged.

The Court did not know how much of the

monthly payments were principal and finance charges versus interest
payments.

The Court did not know whether the refund of $7,800.00

from the title company was factored into the calculation.

There

was also no indication that the $10,000.00 fee due to Steinfeldt,
already set aside, was factored out of the total funds escrowed.
Faced with such uncertainty, the trial court made no clear error in
deciding to award the ascertainable amount as interest costs, and
not a confusing guess. Reeves does not show that award was clearly
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erroneous, and the trial court's award of $403.00 as interest costs
should not be increased.
CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

preceding

arguments

and

cited

points

and

authorities, Thad B. Steinfeldt respectfully requests this Court to
rule Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to
Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prejudgment

motions, and

otherwise

did

not

toll

the

time

for

Steinfeldt to file his Notice of Appeal; and to rule this Court has
proper jurisdiction to hear Steinfeldt's appeal.
Steinfeldt further reiterates his request for this Court to
reverse the trial court's ruling that the parties' agreement
superseded Steinfeldt's statutory right to file a mechanic's lien,
and conclude Steinfeldt's mechanic's lien is valid and enforceable.
Steinfeldt requests the Court to rule the parties' agreement was
not a partial or limited waiver to Steinfeldt's right to file a
mechanic's lien notice because there was no express, clear, and
unambiguous term to partially waive such a right.
Steinfeldt further requests this Court to rule that overstated
fees listed on the mechanic's lien notice was not a breach of the
parties' agreement.

Also, Steinfeldt requests this Court to

reverse the trial court's ruling that Steinfeldt's right to file a
notice of lien was superseded by the August 9, 1994 agreement, and
conclude Steinfeldt's Amended Notice of Lien effectively cured any
alleged prior wrongful filing of the Notice of Lien.

Steinfeldt also requests this Court to hold that Steinfeldt
was entitled to interest on the amount Steinfeldt was due under the
parties' contract pursuant to § 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN.
Steinfeldt further requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's award of attorneys fees to Reeves, and hold that Steinfeldt
is entitled to statutory attorneys fees for this appeal and prior
proceedings because Steinfeldt is the prevailing party in this
action because he was awarded the net judgment of the contract
price from the parties' agreement subject only to offset amounts.
Steinfeldt further requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's ruling that Steinfeldt filed the Notice of Lien "too soon"
or "prematurely/1 allegedly in violation of the mechanic's lien
statutes, and to rule that substantial completion of work does not
mean closing.
Steinfeldt also requests this Court to rule that Reeves'
Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed untimely under Rule 4, Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure, because no motions filed by Steinfeldt
tolled the time to file a notice of appeal.

Further, Steinfeldt

requests this Court not to award additional interest costs to
Reeves because the trial court was not clearly erroneous by
awarding only ascertainable damages.
DATED AND SIGNED this

l/l

day of September, 1995.

William M. Jeffs/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the original and seven (7) copies of REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT and RESPONSE BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE was mailed to the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals, and two (2) true and correct copies of the same was mailed to the below
named party, this / )

day of September, 1995, addressed as follows:
Mr. David D. Lambert
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603

M^ ivft
William M. Jeffs
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Addenda

Addendum 1

ADDENDUM 1
Sec.

15-1-1. Interest rates—Contracted rate—Legal rate

(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose
in action that is the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate
of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to
affect any penalty or interest charge that by law applies to
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made
before May 14, 1981.
UTAH CODE ANN.,

§ 15-1-1

Sec.

38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances

The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish
materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and shall
have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which
may have attached subsequently to the time when the building,
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or
other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which
was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the
ground.
UTAH CODE ANN.

, § 38-1-5

Sec.
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service
owner of property

on

(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of
this chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the
project or improvement shall file for record with the county
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the
property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the
following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the
name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he
furnished the equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was
performed or the first and last equipment or material was
furnished;
(d)
a
description
identification; and

of

the

property,

sufficient

for

(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent
and an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57,
Chapter 3. No acknowledgment or certificate is required for any
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien
claimant shall deliver or mail by certified mail to either the
reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the
notice of lien.
If the record owner's current address is not
readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the
last-known address of the record owner, using the names and
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment
rolls of the county where the affected property is located.
Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner
or record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs
and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record owner in an
action to enforce the lien.
UTAH CODE ANN.,

§ 38-1-7

Sec.

38-1-18. Attorneys' fees

In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as
costs in the action.
UTAH CODE ANN.,

§ 38-1-18

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing-a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.

Rule 52. Findings by the court
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
P , : l I \ fanting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses
I he findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
tact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b) The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
m actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
tor divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived bvy the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
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Counterclaim Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITBES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the Defendant, Thad B. Steinfeldt, by and through counsel,
William M. Jeffs, and hereby supports this Memorandum in Support of this Motion for
Reconsideration to reconsider the court's Memorandum Decision dated October 17, 1994.
A Motion for Reconsideration may be granted as long as there is no signed Order
in the file of the Court. In the October 17, 1994 Memorandum Decision, this Court states as
follows, MThis memorandum decision has no affect until such Order is signed by the Court.M
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently ruled on Motions for Reconsideration. In the case
of Ron Shepherd Insurance v. Sheilds. 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (Utah 1994), they stated as
follows:
It is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at
any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment. Bennion v. Hansen.
699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). In the present case, because no final
order awarding defendant summary judgment was signed and entered, the
matter was still pending when plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was
filed in Judge Lewis's court. She had every right to fully reassess the
matter and, if deemed appropriate, to receive additional evidence. When
Judge Lewis recused herself and the matter was assigned to Judge Rokich,
he likewise had every right to fully review the matter.
Id. at 4.
This court has the ability to re-examine the arguments and evidence submitted by
the parties at trial.

Plaintiffs' counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and a Trial

Memorandum. Defendant did not submit Proposed Findings based upon representation from
Plaintiffs' counsel that he would not be submitting proposed findings. Defendant is submitting

2

a follow-up to the Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

POINT I
THE UTAH CODE DOES NOT PUT A REQUIREMENT
THAT THE MONEY MUST BE DUE PRIOR TO FILING A LIEN.

The court implicit in its Memorandum Decision stated, "However, Defendant

contract, Defendant was to be paid at the time of the closing, at the time Defendant filed the lien
i» MII l 11 ilei I 11 MI Hit Defendant
the August 9 agreement, but, states that the Defendant was not entitled to the money until the
closing date. The Court held that because the Defendant was not entitled to the money until the
Defendant w as pi ech ided from filing tl le liei i Nowhere ii i the tria 1 :)i ii i a rgi 11 i ici its did
Plaintiffs' counsel show any case law or statute that held that a person could not file their lien

is entitled of a lien and what may be attached:
Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons performing any services or
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement
to any premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications,
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a
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lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered
service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment
for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner of any other person acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the
owner may have in the property as stated in that Section.
In the above section it states that they shall have a lien upon the property. In this matter it does
not state that the lien is only valid after time for payment is passed, it states that he has a lien
when the services are rendered. The statute grants a lien to the Defendant, the recordation of
the lien is the way in which an individual perfects the lien. As the services are performed, the
lien accrues, in order for a party to take full advantage of the Mechanics' Lien Statute, they
must perfect the lien and follow the statutory requirements.
In the instant case, Mr. Steinfeldt performed the labor as a general contractor and
the dispute arose as to the amount of payment for his services. His lien attached as the services
were performed. Mr. Steinfeldt is therefore entitled to a lien upon the property as the services
are performed and the time is progressing.
By looking at §38-1-7 UTAH CODE ANN. (1993), we determine the mode of perfection
of that lien:
(1)
Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of this
chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or
improvement shall file for record with the county recorder of the county
in which the property,or some part of the property, is situated, a written
notice to hold and claim a lien.

4

In this Section, it does not require that he file his lien after he has performed his last services
or labor only that he file it within the eighty days after substantial performance. The eighty days
statute of limitations

i

will be no more liens to be filed. As demonstrated hereafter, an individual is authorized to file
a

dispute \ itllll: it the o w nei
In the construction business, it is a common procedure as you are building a residential

home or on a commercial construction site, that as each sub-contractor receives draws
throughout the construction process they file lien waivers for each individual payment that they
receive. There are two reasons for the general having lien waivers signed at this time. First,
sc 1:1 lat 1:1 le si it conti a :toi • :a nn :)!: file a II iei :t foi v «
because the sub-contractor has the right to file the lien at fha runt
i uiili.K Imii in

WJIMH'

u cause the ., t

(li ill In n .liiiiill iriniM llir imj lul I hli llul Iicii in I lie lulim1 loi the past work.

Under the above statutes and reasoning, Defendant was entitled to file his lien on
November 5, 1993 and it was not a wrongfully filed lien. As a side note, it should be noted that
the original lien of November 5, was amende*' - • December ?,\ 199 ^ witl i a i I an iei ided li *i i
If the November lien was an invalid lien because it was filed early, the December 22, 1993 lien
i V t l R V t n i lllil l-Hl'dk'Hi tKVatISi

ll " ' | l

"

,l

• I In * h i n t 1 lili f U ' i l i l h '

1 i l l t ' n III! l i t In v w n I t X O h l u l

AnI acknowledgement was required > )e signed by Mr. Steinfeldt for the title company to
release a portion of the funds out

he escrowed monies and return the money back to the
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Plaintiffs'. In the acknowledgment Mr. Steinfeldt stated that the amended lien is for a reduction
of the claimed lien amount.
The Defendant respectfully requests the court to reconsider its ruling that the lien
filed by Defendant on November 5, 1993, was wrongfully filed and rule that Defendant had the
right to file said lien to protect Defendant's claim for payment.

POINT H
THE AUGUST 9, 1993 AGREEMENT IS NOT
A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT'S LIEN RIGHTS.
Implicit in the Court's Ruling is the fact that by signing the August 9 agreement,
Defendant has waived any of his lien rights pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, of the UTAH CODE
ANN. and Defendant is not entitled to file a lien until after the closing date. As stated by
Defendant's counsel at the trial, in order to waive those lien rights an individual must explicitly
waive those lien rights. In the case at bar, the only statement made was that the Defendant
would be paid at the closing. The Utah courts have not ruled on this issue but, as was pointed
out to the Court, both the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeal of Oregon have
ruled that a party must expressly waive the right to file a lien.
In Ragsdale Bros. Roofing v. United Bank. 744 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1987) it
states as follows:

6

If the terms of the contract and evidence of the alleged waiver of
a mechanics lien are ambiguous, doubt must be resolved against the
waiver. Bishop v. Moore. 137 Colorado 263, 323 P.2d 897 (1958). In
the absence of language clearly indicating an intention to waive a lien, it
will not be supposed that the laborer or materialman intended to relinquish
absolutely his statutory right to claim one beyond the amount of
consideration received. Bishop v. Moore, supra. The trial courts ruling
that Corneau-Finley did not waive its right of lien on the part of its claim
which remained unpaid is supported by competent evidence. Thus, we
conclude that the trial court did not commit error in fact or law.
M. at 754-55.
Oregon Coi u ts support (In. I "olnnadt ("tmi is, In Harris v. Dyer
223, 623 P.2d 662 (1980), it states:
We conclude, therefore, that in the absence or an express waiver
by the contractor of his right to file a construction lien, an agreement to
arbitrate disputes does not deprive him of the right to file a lien. Having
the right to file a claim of lien for amounts claimed to be due would be
a hollow gesture unless the contractor also has the right to pursue that
claim to fruition. If he is not entitled to file a suit to foreclose the lien,
the lien would expire within six months after the filing of the lien claim,
ORS 87.055, and would be for naught. If, however, the contractor files
a suit to foreclose the lien within the statutory period, the lien continues
and, if it ripens into a decree foreclosing it, the lien has priority as of the
date it was filed. ORS 87.025. The priority of the contractor's claim over
other liens against the property might well, in many cases, be the
difference between the contractor's being paid, or not being paid, the full
amount of his claim, (footnotes omitted).

If, as the Plaintiffs' argue, Defendant is not entitled to file a lien and that Plaintiff
has "waived" his lien by signing the August 9 agreement, these cases hold that the waiver must
-*

*
7

KJ

' • * ^ is silent a s to

the right to file a lien. Therefore, the Court is to construe against the waiver and hold that the
lien is a validly filed lien.

POINT m
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
IN THE COLLECTION OF DEFENDANT'S LIEN.
The court awarded Plaintiffs' their attorney's fees in the matter for bringing the action
on the basis that the lien was filed wrongfully, for an excessive amount despite the fact that the
Defendant corrected the filing on December 22, 1993. The court also ruled that it was filed too
soon. The statute does, however, not state that Defendant must wait until the time for payment
is passed before filing the lien. The Court ruled the Defendant to be entitled to the amount
under the contract entered into on August 9, 1993. The Court does not find that the default
violated the code, nor does the court cite a basis for awarding the Plaintiffs' their attorney's
fees. This is unjust to the Defendant on the basis that Defendant was required to defend and
also prosecute their own counterclaim to foreclose the lien and was, in fact, entitled to recovery
under the August 9 agreement and should be entitled to his attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests this court to review the Ruling of October 17, 1994 and
reconsider its ruling that the lien was wrongfully filed and filed too soon and instead rule that
the lien, although it was in excess, was not wrongfully filed and was corrected by the December
8

22, 1993 Amended Lien that corrected the defect and in fact, Defendant is entitled to foreclosure
of their lien and attorney's fees in
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this - > day of October, 1994.

./»

I
William M. Jeffs

/7i
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WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant and
Counter Claimant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 373-8848
Facsimile: 373-8878
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,
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Plaintiffs,

I

vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant,

THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Counterclaimant,
vs.

SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,
Counterclaim Defendants.

I
j
{

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the Defendant, Thad B. Steinfeldt, dba Steinfeldt Construction,
by and through counsel, William M. Jeffs and hereby respectfully submits to the court a Motion
for Reconsideration to reconsider the Court's Octobei I" \ l^'M , Memorandum Decision

Sa id

Motion is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of this
Motion for Reconsidi
DATED AND SIGNED this >w

day of October, 1994.

>M.^

'?<

William M. Jeffs
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Addendum 3

WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #S7?rt
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 373-8848
Facsimile: 373-8878
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,

"

CERTHTCATE OF MAILING

I
Plaintiffs,

I
vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant,

|
|

THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Civil No. 940400014
Judge Ray M. Harding

I hereby certify that the original of Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was sent to the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District
Court, and a true and correct copy of the same was sent to the below named party, with postage
lay of November, 1994, addressed as follows:
pre-paid thereon, this (VlAfay
Mr. David D. Lambert, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
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4>1.9:
s?
WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 373-8848
Facsimile: 373-8878
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTTFFS' PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

|

vs
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant,
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,

j
J
|

Counter Claimant,
vs.
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JTTT TEN. REEVES,
Counterclaim Defendants.

|
Civil No. 940400014
Judge Ray M. Harding

COMES NOW the Defendant, Thad B. Steinfeldt, by and through counsel William
M. Jeffs, and hereby objects to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as follows:
POINT I
General Objection
The Court should not sign the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law until the
Court has ruled on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, which was filed with this Court on
October 25, 1994.

Plaintiff has file a response to the Motion for Reconsideration, but,

Defendant has not file a reply or a Request for Ruling.
POINT H
Specific Objections
1.

Defendant hereby objects to Finding of Fact No. 5, the Court's

Memorandum Decision makes no mention of Defendant's failure to complete the construction.
2.

Defendant hereby objects to Finding of Fact No. 8 on the basis that it is

not a finding of fact, but is a conclusion of law.
3.

Defendant hereby objects to Finding of Fact No. 11 on the basis that it

states that Plaintiffs are the successful party in the lien action. The Court makes no mention in
the Memorandum Decision dated October 17, 1994, who is the successful party in this matter.
4.

Defendant hereby objects to Finding No. 12 on the basis that the Court

only stated in their Memorandum Decision that the Defendant is entitled $10,000, $300 per week
2

and $20 per hour for any extras.

The Court's Memorandum Decision does not make a

determination for the number of weeks for which Defendant is entitled to receive the $300 per
week. The Decision does not make a determination of the number of hours Defendant for which
reimbursement is entitled. It appears that Plaintiffs have deducted a portion of the weekly
supervisory fee and in the Memorandum Decision it does not state, although the Court listed all
of the other deductions and offsets Plaintiffs were entitled to, or make mention of a
determination for the supervisory fee.
5.

Defendant hereby objects to the Conclusion of Law No. 4 on the basis that

it states that there is a limited lien waiver. There was no language in the August 9, 1993,
agreement stating that he was waiving his lien right and no mention in the Memorandum
Decision of a lien waiver, therefore the statement that it was limited lien waiver should be
removed from the Conclusion of Law.
Defendant additionally objects to Conclusion of Law No. 4 on the basis that the
determination that the filing of a lien prior to the closing was a breach of the contract and
wrongful. The Memorandum Decision does not state that the lien was. wrongful, only that it was
filed early by Defendant.

Defendant additionally objects to the Court's Conclusion that a

contractor is not entitled to file a lien until after a time of payment has been passed.
6.

Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 5 on the basis that the Court

concluding that it was a breach of the agreement by failing to participate in the inspection when,
in fact, testimony showed that he had substantially completed the construction.
3

7.

Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 6 on the basis that the

written agreement by demanding an excess is not a breach of the agreement until the Court ruled
that the August 9, 1993 agreement converted the contract from a percentage construction
contract to a flat fee contract Defendant, did not file a wrongful lien.
8.

Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 7 on the basis that the Court

did not state that the Defendant was not due the money until closing of the long-term financing.
9.

Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 10 on the basis that Plaintiffs'

are not the successful party in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this b

day of November, 1994.

William M. Jeffs

T
s I

l)
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Wuty

D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,330

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,

Case No. 940400014
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
The above-captioned matter came on for trial on the 3rd day of October, 1994, the Hon.
Ray M. Harding presiding. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, D. David
Lambert for Howard, Lewis & Petersen. Defendant was present and represented by William
Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs. The Court received the evidence, testimony and arguments of the parties,
and, being fully advised, now makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
L

Jurisdiction and venue are properly before this Court.

2.

Plaintiffs are the joint owners of certain real property located at 53 West 650

North, Lindon, Utah County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows: Lot
8, Plat A, Green Valley Estates.
3.

Defendant acted as the general contractor to build a home for the plaintiffs on

the subject property under an agreement between the parties; however, after construction had
proceeded through approximately the framing stage, the parties discussed and reached a revised
agreement dated August 9, 1993 as to further compensation to the defendant for his work as
general contractor for the construction of the home. That agreement was reduced to writing and
states in its entirety as follows:
At close of house, Thad Steinfeldt will be paid $10,000 which
will be payment in full for all labor and services concerning
Shawn & Julie Reeves' house at 53 W. 650 N. Lindon, Utah.
This is in addition to regular $300\week supervision fees and
hourly wages of $20 approved in advance for any necessary
changes. $14,000 contractor fee in loan is null and void.
S/ T. B. Steinfeldt
S/ S. F. Reeves
4.

The above agreement governs the method and-time of compensation to

Defendant for his work as general contractor.
5.

The defendant failed to complete the work he was to perform as general

contractor and plaintiffs had to procure substitute performance to complete the construction.
6.

Plaintiffs made all payments to defendant required of them pursuant to their

agreement with the defendant through the date of the last draw in October, 1993.

2

7.

On November 5, 1993, defendant filed his original lien against plaintiffs

property claiming the sum of $17,929, The defendant amended his lien on or about the 22nd
day of December, 1993, and claimed a lien amount of $12,764.19.
8.

Defendant should be required to immediately remove the lien against the

plaintiffs' property.
9.

Plaintiffs personally or through arrangements with other contractors, completed

the final construction work and inspections which required 48 hours of their time which is valued
at $20.00 per hour.

Plaintiffs also had to pay Kim Anderson $140.00 for work to finish

construction.
10.

Plaintiffs had to escrow one and one-half of the lien amounts in order to close

the long-term financing.
11.

Plaintiffs are the successful parties in this lien action and have incurred legal

fees of $6,242.50 which were reasonable and necessary.
12.

The amounts due defendant under the terms of the agreement, but for his breach

thereof are $10,000 plus $1,080 for unpaid supervisory fees.
13.

Plaintiffs are entitled to deduct the following amounts from the contract amounts

due to the defendant:
a.

Cost of finishing construction

$ 1,100.00

b.

Cost of escrowing monies for lien

$

c.

Attorneys fees

$ 6,242.50

TOTAL

$ 7,745.50
3

403.00

14.

The total amount due defendant, after the above set offs is $3,334.50.

The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The written agreement set forth in paragraph of the findings above voided any

prior agreements between the parties.
2.

The language of the parties' written agreement is clear and unambiguous;

3.

The language of the written agreement which specifies the method of payment

to the defendant should be enforced as written.
4.

The specific terms of the written agreement concerning the time of payment

superseded the defendant's general right to claim a lien and constituted a limited lien waiver.
For these reasons, defendant's filing of the lien prior to the closing of the long-term financing
was a breach of contract and wrongful.
5.

The defendant breached his agreement to act as general contractor by failing

to finalize construction and failing to participate in the final inspection process.
6.

Defendant breached the written agreement between the parties by demanding,

in the bill submitted and in the original lien filed, payments substantially in excess of the
compensation specified in the agreement.
7.

Plaintiffs made all payments to defendant required of them pursuant to their

agreement with the defendant as of the date of the last draw in October, 1993, and further
monies due defendant were not to be paid until closing of the long-term financing.
4

8.

Defendant must immediately remove the lien from plaintiffs' property.

9.

Plaintiffs are the successful party in this action and are entitled to fees pursuant

to U.C.A. § 38-1-18.
10.

Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs as provided by Rule 54(d), U. R. Civ.

P.
DATED this < /

day of November, 1994.
BY^THE COURT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this <P-(

day of October, 1994.

William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
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Di-puty

D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

J:\ddl\recvcs.jud
Our FUe No. 22,330
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 940400014
Judge Ray M. Harding

vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for trial on the 3rd day of October, 1994, the Hon.
Ray M. Harding presiding. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, D. David
Lambert for Howard, Lewis & Petersen. Defendant was present and represented by William
Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs. The Court received the evidence, testimony and arguments of the parties,
and, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and
enters a judgment in the case.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The written agreement set forth in paragraph 3 of the Court'sfindingsvoided

any prior agreements between the parties.
2.

The language of the parties' written agreement is clear and unambiguous;

3.

The language of the written agreement which specifies the method of payment

to the defendant shall be enforced as written.
4.

The specific terms of the written agreement concerning the time of payment

superseded the defendant's general right to claim a lien and constituted a limited lien waiver.
For these reasons, defendant's filing of the lien prior to the closing of the long-term financing
was a breach of contract and wrongful.
5.

The defendant breached his agreement to act as general contractor by failing

to finalize construction and failing to participate in the final inspection process.
6.

Defendant breached the written agreement between the parties by demanding,

in the bill submitted and in the original lien filed, payments substantially in excess of the
compensation specified in the agreement.
7.

Plaintiffs made all payments to defendant required of them pursuant to their

agreement with the defendant as of the date of the last draw in October, 1993, and further
monies due defendant were not to be paid until closing of the long-term financing.
8.

Defendant must immediately remove the lien from plaintiffs' property.

2

9.

Plaintiffs are the successful party in this action and are entitled to fees pursuant

to U.C.A. § 38-1-18.
10.

Plaintiffs are entitled to set offs of $7,714.25 against amounts owed to

defendant of 11,080, leaving a balance due to defendant of 3,365.75.
11.

Plaintiffs are awarded their costs in the sum of $546.60.

DATED this */_ day of November.,..1994.

/'/

V

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this **• '

day of October, 1994.

William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
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Addendum 6

D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

J :\ddl\reevesnt.jud
Our File No. 22,330

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES nad JULIE N.
REEVES,

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,

Case No. 940400014
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
TO: THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, Defendant.
You are hereby given notice that a judgment against you was entered in this action on
the 4th day of November, 1994. A copy of said judgment is attached.
DATED this

*

day of November, 1994.

D. D A V I B ^ A M B L K I , / t o r :

HOWARD, LEWIS A^ffETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been mailed to the
following defendant, this zt

day of November, 1994:

William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
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Addendum 7

FILED
Fourth Jydir-ial District Court of
Utah Coijniv. Stale of Utah.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COXJ^SS^'
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
™ "" ~

SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,
Plaintiffs,

Deputy

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 940400014
DATE: December 8, 1994
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING

vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT
CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for consideration of Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration, Defendant's Request for Oral Arguments and Defendant's Objections to
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court having considered
memorandum both in support and in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration hereby
denies the motion. The Court further finds as follows:
Defendant filed its Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on November 8, 1994. The Court having previously signed the Findings of Fact and
Judgment in this matter on November 4, 1994, overrules the objection. Further, the Court
finds that the Request for Oral Arguments was not timely filed and therefore denies the
request.
Counsel for Plaintiffs is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effectjuntil
such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 8th day of December, 1994.

cc:

D. David Lambert, Esq.
William M. Jeffs, Esq.

A
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witness.
MR. JEFFS:

At this time, your Honor, we

would like to call Thad Steinfeldt.
THE COURT:

If you'd come forward, sir, and

take the witness chair.

I remind you you are still

under oath.
THAD BRENT STEINFELDT
recalled as a witness herein, having previously
been sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q

You've already stated your name for the

record, but could you tell us how long you've been in
the construction business?
A

My grand dad was a building contractor, so my

whole life, I guess.
Q

Just about as long as you can remember?

A

Pretty much.

Q

From August 9th to November 3rd did you

continue to act as the general contractor for the
Reeves?
A

Yes.

Q

And what work did you perform during that

time?
A

Scheduled the subcontractors, coordinated
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
M r+r*

169
fees?
A

Yes.
MR. JEFFS:

I have no further questions, your

THE COURT:

Very well.

Honor.
You may

cross-examine.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. LAMBERT:
Q

Mr. Steinfeldt, I want to refer your

attention to Exhibit 5.

I'm going to show you now

what we've previously marked and received as Exhibit
No. 5.

And in Exhibit 5 under the labor for the your

alleged extra charges there isn't one thing in there
about the dark room, is there?
A

No.

Q

And other than that explanation on Exhibit

No. 5, you've never provided the Reeves with any other
explanation of the work that you did for these 53
hours of extras that you've claimed; isn't that
correct?
A

Other than this?

Q

Correct.

A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

Now, with respect to the way that you were

getting paid for supervision, you were getting paid
Vonda Bassett, RPR,

(801) 429-1080
A r\
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Q

But in point of fact, you told us in your

deposition testimony that you left the job because
they wouldn't pay the supervisory fee past that week;
isn't that correct?
A

The reason that I didn't come back after.

Q

No.

I'm asking you is it correct that you

told us that?
A

I can't remember what I said.

Q

Well, let me show it to you.
MR. LAMBERT:

Do you have the original

deposition?
MR. JEFFS:

What page are you on.

MR. LAMBERT:

Fifty-two.

Your Honor, I've got the original.

I'm

asking that it be published.
THE COURT:

All right.

It may be opened and

given to the witness.
Q

(BY MR. LAMBERT)

Mr. Steinfeldt, I'm going

to show you your deposition that was taken on the 9th
day of March, 1994, and ask you to turn to page 52.
Let's see if I've got the right page here.

Well,

that's not the right page.
There it is.
you at that time.

This is the question I put to

"You're telling us here today that

the one and only reason you left the job was because
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
erno
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they weren't going to continue paying your supervisory
fee beyond the week ending November 6th?"
A

Now I'm lost.

Where are you at?

Q

Down at the bottom, the last question on --

it's actually on page 53.
minute.

I'm sorry.

I'm all goofed up.

No, wait a

Let's start over again.

It's on page 53 in the middle, and I'm going
to begin at line 1.

And it goes down through the

middle there.
The question was, "Friday was November the
5th.

Saturday, November 6th, would be the last day of

that week.

They told you they were'nt going to pay

your supervisory fees beyond that week; correct?"
Your answer was, "I can't remember the facts
other than they said they didn't want me there after
that date."
Question, "After November 5th?"
Answer, "Yes."
Question, "That's the reason that you left
the job?"
Answer, "Yes."
Were those the questions and answers that
were put to you on that date?
A

Yes.

Q

And, in fact, that was contemplated, as we've
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
er r\

A

JL O JL

stated, that you were not going to be paid beyond the
date the construction was complete; correct?
A

Yes.

Q

But that was your reason for leaving the job.

So I want you to explain that to me.
A

Why I left?

Q

Why was the failure to pay supervisory fees

beyond that week justification for you leaving the
job?
A

Well, on November the 3rd in their office we

had this small punch list of items from the inspector,
and it was obvious to me that —

I had already

contacted the electrician, made copies, highlighted
things to be completed.
And I told the Reeves that night, I said,
"Well, it's obvious that there's not much for me to
do.

How much longer do you want me to stay on this

job?"
And they said, "Friday is the last day that
we want you here."
And that's why I didn't return after Friday.
Q

But Friday was the day they intended to go

through the final inspection process with you; isn't
that correct?
A

That's correct.
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080

Addendum 10

118
MR. LAMBERT:
THE COURT:

Absolutely.
All right, then.

Attorneys 1

fees

may be submitted by affidavit based upon the
stipulation here in open court.
MR. LAMBERT:

Let me make sure if we've

received all my exhibits.
(Discussion held off the record.)
MR. LAMBERT:

Actually, I want to call

Mr. Steinfeldt on my case in chief briefly.
THE COURT:

All right.

If you'll come

forward, please, raise your right hand, the clerk will
administer the oath.
THAD BRENT STEINFELDT
called as a witness herein, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT:

Have a seat in the witness chair,

please.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LAMBERT:
Q

Mr. Steinfeldt, will you please state your

full name.
A

Thad Brent Steinfeldt.

Q

Where do you reside?

A

143 South 800 East, Spanish Fork, Utah.

Q

And are you a licensed general contractor in
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
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1

Q

When you filed your lien on November the 5th,

2

you had never sent a billing to the Reeves for the

3

last work you had done, had you?

4

A

I mailed that bill on that day since that was

5

the last day that they wanted me on the job.

6

not bill them prior to that time because I actually

7

wasn't sure when they wanted me to finish my

8

responsibilities as general contractor.

9

submitted the bill on the 5th, which was Friday.

10
11

Q

I could

And so I

But you knew the Reeves intended to move in

over the weekend, didn't you?

12

A

That was their plan, yes.

13

Q

And they advised you of that?

14

A

Yeah, I knew they were going to do that.

15

Q

And did you discuss with them on Wednesday

16

after the inspection had been made that they wanted

17

the inspector to come back for the final inspection on

18

Friday so they could move in over the weekend?

19

A

That was our intention, yes.

20

Q

But you did not schedule that inspection on

21
22
23
24
25

Friday, did you?
A

No, I did not schedule that on Friday.

I'll

tell you why if you want to know.
Q

Well, what I'm saying is that when you filed

your lien on Friday the 5th, you had never submitted a
Vonda B a s s e t t ,

RPR,

(801)

429-1080
AAA

witness .
MR. JEFFS:

At this time, your Honor, we

would like to call Thad Steinfeldt.
THE COURT:

If you'd come forward, sir, and

take the witness chair,

I remind you you are still

under oath.
THAD BRENT STEINFELDT
recalled .as a witness herein, having previously
been sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q

You've already stated your name for the

record, but could you tell us how long you've been in
the construction business?
A

My grand dad was a building contractor, so my

whole life, I guess.
Q

Just about as long as you can remember?

A

Pretty much.

Q

From August 9th to November 3rd did you

continue to act as the general contractor for the
Reeves?
A

Yes.

Q

And what work did you perform during that

time?
A

Scheduled the subcontractors, coordinated
Vonda Bassett, RPR,

(801)

429-1080

Aca
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1
2
3

Q

And they had stated that they were not paying

these subs the additional amount?
A

I told them that they didn't have many of the

4

final invoices and that some of these would be higher

5

than what was the original estimate.

6

"Well, all we're paying is what they told us that they

7

would charge us for."

And Shawn said,

8

Q

So you filed a lien on November 4th; correct?

9

A

The 5th.

10

Q

Excuse me.

Thank you.

For

approximately

11

$17,900?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And how did you come up with that figure?

14

A

I knew how much we had drawn on the home up

15

to that point.

16

down each of the categories on our estimate sheet, and

17

I estimated because the Reeves wouldn't tell -- I

18

asked them.

And I knew in my mind what —

I went

19

I said, "I would like to see the invoices."

20

And they said, "No, we're not going to show

21

them to you."

22

So I had to estimate what the total would be

23

on each of those invoices, and that's how I arrived at

24

that number, four percent of that cost.

25

Q

And then you did a four percent cost?
Vonda Bassett, RPR,

(801) 429-1080

(Exhibit 29 received into evidence.)
Q

(BY MR. JEFFS)

Were all of the expenses

that you have just testified to necessary and
reasonable in the construction of the Reeves home?
A

Yes.

Q

When did you learn that your request for

payment of four percent on the cost of the house was
in error?
A

Last week or the week before.

Q

So up until that time you felt that you were

entitled to four percent of the cost?
A

Yes.

Q

Why did you file your lien on November 5th?

A

Say that again.

Q

Why did you file your lien on November 5th?

A

To protect my financial interest in the work

that I had done.
Q

Because you had felt nervous --

A

I was nervous.

Q

-- about getting paid?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you intend to create any problems or

financial problems for the Reeves by filing your lien?
MR. LAMBERT:
THE COURT:

Objection.

Leading.

I'll sustain the objection.

Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080

It

165
1
2
3

is leading.
Q

(BY MR. JEFFS)

Do you know if the Reeves

had a bond on the project?

4

A

I don't know of one.

5

Q

Did they request one from you?

6

A

No.

7

Q

What was your intention in signing the

8
9

August 9th .agreement?
A

I knew after they had faxed me -- Shawn faxed

10

me a letter saying he wanted a breakdown of all the

11

framing costs.

12

realized that I had billed them for $4,000 above and

13

beyond any costs that I had incurred.

14

signed that agreement, in my mind it was to insure

15

that I did not try to collect the full amount of the

16

original estimate.

17

I went through all my expenses and

MR. LAMBERT:

And when we

Your Honor, I object.

I don't

18

think that's responsive to the question, and I ask

19

that it be stricken.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

Well, I'll permit it as being his

explanation of why he signed it.
Q

(BY MR. JEFFS)

You heard Mr. Lambert in his

23

opening statement state that the August 9th

24

agreement —

25

agreeing to receive payment at the closing, that you

by signing the August 9th agreement and

Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
M~~

i

Addendum 11

NOU-24-1993 09:17 FROM

Security Title - Provo UT TO

3774991

P.01

ilk*
NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM Tt MAY CONCERN!
Notltt It Unkv ctvM tfctt th. i m j . n l n ^

^ ^

THAP B. STEIKm.PT

_

ilMMJy STEIKFELDT COttSTKUCTIOW
!?T5BB?ff
'^tniShroS?."^
County o f J g ^
8ttttofVtth.h.rthjrcU!m~.
•fid intendstohold tad <I«Jm • tin upon thtt etrUIn knd tad prtmlMt, owatd tnd ropnttdtobo
•WBtl «T Shavn F, t Jul It H. Ro»vt»
tbd

•itotta, trlftf tad MmtaJ2JKSIiilSJLJfel!!SSSJ?W!>—* c«mt> *f—8Mb
8UW tftfth, d«MTtUd M follow to wttu
.QfW « = m

">T,8| VUT A,

C^MSLm&tiUm~.

H^»5'

-M€OAOC»-FM-miHPEL-of"MNifwcrtm

MMiWUlllMIII*

toMean thiptrmtat of th. •«» 6 fXCTDnx^^T1MSA^ l .Ai.LU^ML^mi^JNK
owlttf to tho raltrtffM* '•» tAK>R. MATERIAL AKP COHTIUCTORS FEE

MUttt

-—-«——"——"

.. . CEHERAL COKTBACTOtt
In, on tnd tbout t h o J S S T O V I L M f f l S

. , „ „u Utid.

Thtt tht uld IndtbUdntu »ccrvtd Mid th* und«rilfn«d furniihod uld mtttrltl* to (or w«i »mcloy^br) S1IAVN P. a JULIE N. REEVES
Wll>llltl>H..H.,l

^

-whu wa* tht

SA D

*
--..owner and tht rtputtd owntr of mid prtmlft* M
afortaald, tmdtf A - j a ? . H E N „ c 6 0 t w t **d# brtwMh the **M SHAWN F, & m i Q ^ K K V K S
M 4mdthtundtriifntd
oo tht M
day c k J j g K l L .
^ 19J&* by the urm* of which tht und«rtl«nod did a * m
Id -MAKAGE THE PROJECT FDR U% OF TOTAL COST CONSTRUCTION! PLUS $300.00 PER VKKK
M ( l f j * toM, SHAVX F ,ftJULIE N, JEEVES
did a*ra# to pay thf Ufidtrilfufd thtrtfcr u followi, to wit:..-.i&S8JS-ifiBXL
i l l w w i O l l l i l H i l i l i i H •«•««•««*«« «*•«•*«

•——„——„_.«««»4..........
and undar which laid contract tht unvWr*
•l*i>tddW.&WW?
.,.•_
t h # f|nit„.Vork
onlh«
dmyof
..tto.C5*.J.V9A_ ... . and did C^plotr I'IOJ,, t
thf|Ml
oflthf
>th . .day of ^iviHnboi 1W3
and on and bciwwn aald lail monUorwd
day., did
COMPLY PKOlECT
_ „ ,
_ .
_ amounting
to tht turn of . . S K Y K * ^
Dollar,,
which wa* iht rvaautiHble vaiui ihrrtof, and on which the fullowlntf paymtnU h«v# Utn mad* t<i wtt:
WHY.
Jtavlnf ibaiineiowinxtothtundtrfiffntdof. SWESTKKN TlWtSAMI). SINK mwfiKfJ), ..TWKNTY
Pcllartifurdfduvtmf all juit crodlU tnd offMU, and for which
dtftiftd tht undf rtif ntd hold,, and claim-.. * U«t by VJM*> of ti» pravUUnn of Ch«Pi«r i ( of TIUC

MINI:

M< vf i\%* Vxtkh OKI* Annul**™! 1603.

*:rri%'n:i.irr <T>sr.TMf*<-i I«IN

M - .... i. «™ r.i...

•/•

-^

I*

m

........

PLAINTIFF'
EXHfBIT

H"'8?

\

NOU-24-1993

09:18

FROM

Security Title - Frovo UT

tTAtfcOrUTA*,

TD

3774991

CKT79809 BK 3 2 9 0 P€
>

TH*Q E,

St&tNfftPT

-bttaf flrtt duty iwonu Mgn that ht U

JSbasL

Almint,.. la tin toifot&f Nottet of Utn;

fcrt kt W» W*f* m * a»M MiWt «*4 bowi OM totum* tb*t*^t&<i thA*U»i*n» Utrvtof hU

<nhtcriU<iai
Motet? Public

: 8

i ? r

I

2
o

i
£

ft

o

4

k

JB
C

I
3

73

P.02

Addendum 12

D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

J:\ddl\recves.ans
Our File No. 22,330

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT AND
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S FIRST SET
OF INTERROGATORIES TO
PLAINTIFFS AND COUNTERCLAIM
DEFENDANTS
Case No. 940400014
Hon. Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

Plaintiffs submit the following answers to Defendant and Counterclaimant's First Set
of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Did you enter into a contract whereby defendant was to
construct a building for plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
building?

What was the contract price for constructingjtas

SFi&CEWED
MAY 1 6 1994

ANSWER:

Originally 4% of selected items that plaintiffs had not taken care of

themselves. Defendant wrongfully drew almost $14,000.00 from plaintiffs' construction loan
under the framing labor category beyond that authorized. Plaintiffs confrorfted defendant about
the overdraft or theft and defendant confessed that the monies were wrongfully taken. On that
basis, a new contract was signed by both parties for a flat $10,000.00 fee and the agreement to
pay a percentage of construction costs was voided. A copy of th efinal agreement has been
provided.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: What was the contract price to be paid to defendant for
constructing the building?
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory no. 2.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Was any provision made for any extra work or changes
that were to be made?
ANSWER:

Not originally. The final written agreement allowed $20/hour for

changes approved in advance. Previously plaintiffs paid all actual labor and materials involved
in changes.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If so, what provision was made for extra work or
changes?
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory no. 4.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: On what date was the defendant to begin construction
on the building?
2

ANSWER:

Approximately April 1, 1993.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Did you furnish the defendant with detailed plans and
specifications for constructing this building?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8: If so, on what date did you furnish the plans?
ANSWER:

February, 1993.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9: What is the name, or other means of identification, and
address of the architect who prepared these plans?
ANSWER:

Larry Schaugaard, Pleasant Grove, Utah.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Did you at any time inspect the progress of the
construction?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If so, please state:
a.

The date and time of each inspection; and

b.

What you inspected on each occasion.

ANSWER:

Plaintiffs inspected the property daily to assess progress.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Did any one [sic] else inspect the progress of the
construction?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 13: If so, please state:
3

a.

The name, or other means of identification, and address of each person

who made an inspection;
b.

The profession or other qualification of each person who made an

c.

The date and time of each inspection; and

d.

What was inspected on each occasion.

inspection;

ANSWER:
a and b.

Arlan Ostergaard, General Contractor; Carl Baldwin, General

Contractor; Kim Anderson, General Contractor, and LIndon City building inspectors.
c and d.

Mr. Ostergaard inspected uneven door heights in early July,

1993. Exact items inspescted and dates of inspection by the other contractors are presently
unknown to plaintiffs
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Did you find any defects in the work during any
inspection while construction was in progress?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If so, please state:
a.

The date of each inspection when the defects were found;

b.

The name, or other means of identification, of the person who found

c.

What was defective; and

each defect;

d.
ANSWER:

The facts on which you rely in contending the defect existed.
Door heights and items specified by the building inspector.

INTERROGATORY NO, 16: Were any defects brought to the attention of the
defendant, or was he asked to correct any defects?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO, 17: If so, please state:
a.

The name, or other means of identification, of each person who

requested that any defect be corrected;
b.

What the defendant was requested to correct;

c.

The date that the defendant was requested to make each correction;

d.

What was said to the defendant;

e.

Whether the defendant agreed to make each correction; and

f.

What the defendant said in his reply.

ANSWER:

Plaintiffs brought to the attention of Mr. Steinfeldt the fact that

numerous door heights were wrong and requested him to measure them again and fix the
problem. They were told by Mr. Steinfeldt that he would take care of it. The other defects
were noted after defendant left the job.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Did the defendant make any correction of any alleged
defects?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19: If so, please state:
a.

The date that each correction was made;

b.

What was corrected on each day; and

c.

How each alleged defect was corrected.

ANSWER:

In approximately August, 1993 the door heights were changed but they

were still the wrong height. Plaintiffs paid for the labor to do this. Finally, Kim Anderson, a
finish contractor, and crew came in and fixed each door.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Did the defendant refuse to make any correction of any
alleged defect?
ANSWER:

On the second request, he refused.

Plaintiffs then called in Kim

Anderson to finish the job.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: If so, please state:
a.

The date that the defendant refused to correct any defect;

b.

Which defect was refused to correct on each date;

c.

The reason defendant gave for refusing each defect; and

d.

What the defendant said when he refused to correct each defect.

ANSWER:

In approximately September, 1993 they asked defendant to correct the

door height problem and he refused. He gave no reason for not wanting to do it. He said Kim
Anderson could do it.

6

INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Did the defendant complete the construction of the
building?
ANSWER:

No.

INTERROGATORY NO, 23; If the defendant did not complete the construction of
the building, was construction finally completed?
ANSWER:

Yes, all but some finish work for which plaintiffs are waiting materials.

INTERROGATORY NO. 24: If so, please state:
a.

The name, or other means of identification, and address of each person

who supervised this construction;
b.

The date that this person started supervision;

c.

The date that construction was completed; and

d.

The cost to complete construction.

ANSWER:
a.

Plaintiffs; Arlan Ostergaard, General Contractor; Kim Anderson,

General Contractor; and Mark Larson.
b.

In approximately November, 1993.

c.

The construction was completed on approximately January 15, 1994.

d.

The cost of completion was approximately $3,000.00.

INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Did you order the defendant to quit construction of the
building?

ANSWER:

No.

INTERROGATORY NO. 26: If so, please state:
a.

The date that he was ordered to quit; and

b.

The reason he was ordered to quit.

ANSWER:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Did you request any changes in the original plans while
construction was under way?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 28: If so, please state:
a.

The date each change was requested; and

b.

What changes were requested.

ANSWER:

In approximately September, 1993, they made a change in the small

2-foot wall by the refrigerator at defendant's suggestion. Defendant made it uneven so the
cabinetmaker had to make uneven trim.
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Did the defendant agree to -make these changes?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 30: If so, please state:
a.

When did defendant agree to make the changes;

b.

The name, or other form of identification, and address of each person

present when he agreed to make any requested changes; and
8

c.
ANSWER:

The change defendant agreed to make.
Defendant agreed to the changes on the same day they were requested

by the plaintiffs at his suggestion.
INTERROGATORY NO, 31: Did you agree to pay any additional compensation for
making these changes?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO, 32: If so, please state:
a.

The date when you agreed to pay the additional amount;

b.

The amount of extra compensation that you agreed to pay for the

c.

The name, or other means of identification, and address of each person

changes; and

present when you agreed to pay the extra compensation.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs agreed to pay the additional amount on the same day they

made the request for changes. Materials and framing hours at $20/hour.
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Did you pay the defendant any portion of the contract
price for the construction of the building?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 34: If so, please state:
a.

The date on which you made each payment;

b.

The amount of each payment; and

c.
ANSWER:

The stage of completion of the building when you made each payment.
See draw sheet.

INTERROGATORY NO, 35: Did you pay the defendant anything for extra work that
he did?
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory on the basis the phrase Mextra

work" is vague and ambiguous.

Plaintiffs paid all monies due defendant up to the time

defendant abandoned the job.
INTERROGATORY NO, 36: If so, please state:
a.

For what extra work he was paid;

b.

The amount that he was paid; and

c.

The date that he was paid.

ANSWER:

See objection above and answer to no. 37 below.

INTERROGATORY NO. 37: Did you pay the defendant the full amount that was due
him on the contract for extra work and for other incidentals?
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs paid all sums as they came due; however, defendant did not

bill plaintiffs for the last monies due at closing and instead, liened the property.
INTERROGATORY NO. 38: If not, please state:
a.

What amounts have not been paid; and

b.

The reason that each such amount has not been paid.

10

ANSWER:

Plaintiffs were not provided invoices or verification for any "extra

work" now claimed by defendant and plaintiffs received no advance notice of such work.
INTERROGATORY NO. 39; What is the complete cost of the construction of the
building?
ANSWER:

Approximately $550,000.

INTERROGATORY NO. 40; Itemize each individual cost by sub-contractor, date of
payment and amount paid, and what part of construction it related to.
ANSWER:

See Zion's Mortgage Co. draw sheets in possession of defendant's

counsel.
DATED this )2

day of May, 1994.

HOWARD, LEWI,
Attorneys for Plaint1
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. REEVES, being first duly sworn, depose and state
that they are the plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, that the have read the foregoing Answers
to Interrogatories and that the same are true and accurate to the best of their own personal
knowledge, information and belief.

SHAWN F. REEVES

JULJEJ*. REEVES

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

of May, 1994

/••EiftSSaftA
i ®*vEcPJr/
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A>Ut AN.*. 't 20 East
y*y Commission 6: *p.T\ir.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this 1 ^-> day of May, 1994.
William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

?ML
TARY
J:\DDL\REEVES.ANS
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the job?
A

No, he did not.

There were no draws

submitted.
MR. LAMBERT:

Those are all the questions I

have of this witness.
MR. JEFFS:

Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Very well.

MR. LAMBERT:

You may step down.

Your Honor, at this time I'll

call Mr. Reeves.
THE COURT:

All right.

If you 1 11 come

forward, please, raise your right hand, the clerk will
administer the oath to you.
SHAWN F. REEVES
called as a witness herein, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT:

Be seated in the witness chair,

please.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LAMBERT:
Q

Mr. Reeves, will you please state your full

name.
A

Shawn Farrell Reeves.

Q

And where do you reside?

A

53 West 650 North in Lindon, Utah.

Q

And you are married to Julie Reeves who just
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
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the cost of completing the work he had not performed?
A

Yes, I did.
MR. LAMBERT:

Those are all the questions I

have.
THE COURT:

You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q

When was your construction loan going to

expire?
A

The short-term?

Q

Uh-huh.

A

November 12th.

Q

November 12th.

Did you tell -- in the

meeting of November 3rd did you tell Mr. Steinfeldt
that you wanted the house to be completed by
November 5th?
A

That's when Thad said it would be scheduled.

We would have final inspection on Friday.

He would

take care of that.
Q

And when did you receive your temporary

occupancy?
A

That Friday afternoon at 4:15 when the

building inspector came by.

He said, "You guys have

taken care of all the safety problems.

Here go ahead

and start moving your luggage and your clothes.
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You're welcome to do so."
Q

So that was at 4:15?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

So you moved in when?

A

We started moving stuff over on Saturday.

Q

This is Exhibit 14 which is the Lindon City

Building Inspection Report.

And on the first page

there's a long list that your wife and I went over.
When was the first time you saw that document?
A

When we came to the house on Thursday

morning, this list was posted.

And we were told then

by the building inspectors we had to have all the
safety stuff done to be able to be move on Saturday,
not to get a final, but just to move in.

It would

have been the Thursday morning before.
Q

Along the left-hand side of that document

there's a series of marks, little tiny slash marks it
looks like.
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Do you know who put those on there?

A

I don't.

But by looking at the categories, I

would say those are safety items that have to be done.
Every one of those are safety items.
Q

And some of those are dealing with the

electrical; correct?
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A

Yes.

And that was part of the safety.

of them are electrical.
also.

Most

Fire-rated doors is listed

These are the things we had to get done so we

could get in for temporary, the things we didn't want
to get hurt.
Q

Do you know if Mr. Steinfeldt contacted any

of the subcontractors to take care of those items
prior to the 5th?
A

I'd say no.

To the best of my knowledge

I'd

say no because we had to call and it was news to
everybody we had to do this and this and this.
news to everybody.

It was

So I would say to the best of my

knowledge, no, he did not.
Q

Mr. Lambert read you a long list of things

that you claimed were not completed.

And I'd like to

go over those for just a moment with you.

You stated,

and we just talked about it, that there were some
electrical stuff that needed to be completed.
Do you know who is responsible to take care
of the actual repair of those problems that were
needed to be done?
A

Well, the ultimate responsibility would be

the general contractor.

But since he wasn't there, I

worked with Wayne Mortensen, an electrician, and Jeff,
his number one man, in telling what the priority
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were that needed to be done.
Q

Is it normally the general contractor's job

to contact those people and have them come in and fix
the problem?
A

Yes, but they were already there because they

had not finished hanging all of their lights.

They

were there anyway.
Q

Did you specifically work on the electrical,

I mean physically do some of the electrical work?
A

Yeah, minor.

I mean, I put on some plates,

metal plates, and stuff to hide things so they would
pass, not to hide them, but to cover -- you know, put
metal plates on the sockets and stuff.

I did a little

bit of that, but most of it I had Jeff and those guys
do.
Q

Moving on to the painting, you said they

showed up to your house and started taking paint out
of your garage.

That's always an interesting concept

to me since you purchased the paint anyway.

When was

that conversation with those people in your garage?
A

That was on the 4th, on that Thursday.

Q

And what did they tell you?

A

Well, for one thing they took all their paint

supplies.

I mean, they took all their brushes and

rollers, but not the physical paint.

They took all
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their equipment.
I didn't mean to say the paint.
course, I did purchase the paint.
the time that the funds —

But, of

But they told me at

that Thad had called the

owner G and M and frozen the funds and put a lien on
the house, and they would not be paid, so they were
not going to do the touch-ups for me.
Q

Did you know if the lien had been filed at

the time of that conversation?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Was it filed?

A

I had an employee that was placing a lien,

one of my employees was placing a lien on one of my
builder contractors.

And he happened to be in the

same line that Thad was.
doing.

And he noticed what Thad was

He called me and notified me on my cellular

phone that Thad was in line putting a lien on my home.
Q

This is a copy of Exhibit 2.

And on that it

shows the recording information right there.

Could

you please read the date that that was recorded.
A

It was recorded on -- I can't tell the

number -- November -- I don't know if that's a 3 or
a 5.

But it says 2:43 p.m.
Q

Is that a 5?

A

It could be a 5 or a 3.
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Q

So, in other words, the lien had not been

filed -A
filed,

It was not recorded.

It could have been

Mark was there that afternoon, so I don't

know.
Q

Let's move on to sheet rock.

You stated that

you had to have some sheet rock done?
A

That's correct.

Q

And Kent Brezee did that?

A

That's right.

Q

And what areas needed to be sheet rocked?

A

Well, mostly they were touch-ups and repairs.

Like I stated before, the electricians —

where all

the plugs were wrong, had to be ripped out and resheet
rocked around them, retextured, repainted.

And Kent

did a lot of that for us.
And there was a lot of touch-ups too in
certain areas that he -- like the textures -- he'd
say, "I've got to do this over again.
right."

This isn't

Like a painter, he did his job 100 percent

like he liked it.
Q

Whose responsibility is it to make sure that

the sheet rocking was done properly?
A

The ultimate responsibility would be the

general contractor's.
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Q

Would it have been Thad's responsibility to

physically do the sheet rocking?
A

Of course not.

Q

Let's talk about your refrigerator.

And I

guess you stated you had Arlan Ostergaard -A

Yes.

Q

-- hook the plumbing up for that.

Whose

responsibility is that?
A

It's the general contractor's responsibility

to set all the appliances in the home and make sure
they're functioning in good order.
Q

Let's go way back to March of '93 when you

originally entered into the contract.

Isn't it true

that when you entered into the cost plus contract with
Mr. Steinfeldt that landscaping and appliances were
not to be included in that figure?
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay.

Kim Anderson came in and did some

doors, and I missed part of this one, and so you'll
have to tell me again.

What did Mr. Anderson actually

do?
A

Kim did extensive -- actually ripped out a

few doors.

Thad's framing crew had misframed them two

to three times at different heights.
original doors would not fit in them.

And so the
So they tore

Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080

86
them out and put in new finish work and actually
modified all the doors or the door openings so the
doors would fit because the framing heights had been
all off, every door was different.
Q

Which doors did he do?

A

The ones he repaired —

door.

He repaired the guest bedroom door, a couple of

the bathroom doors.
doors.

he repaired my office

I think one of the kid's bedroom

And then also the door down to the basement

had to be redone.
Q

Which door in the basement?

A

The door going down, not the one down, but

the first one.
Q

Let's talk about rekeying the house.

When

did you have it rekeyed actually?
A

I'd have to look at the receipt, but I think

it was on Friday the 5th is when we had it rekeyed.
Q

And do you know who arranged for that?

A

Yes.

My wife called Orem Locksmith, and they

came out on Saturday -- actually called them Friday,
couldn't make it, said they'd be out Saturday morning.
And he rekeyed the locks for us.
Q

Let's talk about the linoleum, and it was

bubbling and waving.
A

It hadn't set yet.
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Q

And you had to increase the heat in the room;

is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And then put weights on it?

A

That's correct.

Q

Do you know if when they originally laid the

linoleum if the heat was on at the house at that time?
A

At the time they laid the linoleum they told

us it was in the recommended temperature range, that
it shouldn't be a problem with Mannington.
Q

Who told you that?

A

The guys at the floor covering place.

they said it was an allowable temperature.

And so

They said

it was boardor line, but they said it should work out
fine.

And if not, we'll cover it and warranty it and

get it done right.
Q

You talked about the trim that needed to

be -- I believe you said hung or put in place.
A

Finish work.

Q

Do you know which trim specifically that was?

A

We had trim in our timber room, we call it,

all the way around where the sheet rock met.

And we

had just a lot of base and finish work around -between, you know, the washer and dryer, and the
office area, just little places, a few feet, three
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feet, molding, a little cove that had not been put in.
Basically, touch-up and to finish all the finish work.
Q

And whose responsibility would that normally

have been to do the trim work, the finish carpenter?
A

Under the direction of the general

contractor, sure.
Q

Who was the finish contractor?

A

Kim Anderson and Boyd Tibbets.

Q

So you just had to schedule them to come in

and do that is what effectively took place?
A

Beside scheduling them and calling them, we

had to point out all the places that weren't done and
that we wanted done, and materials, stain, the whole
nine yards.
They had used up a lot of the stuff on
redoing the doors that Thad had left wrong.

And we

had to buy more materials and things like that because
of the mistakes in all the door heights.
Q

Let's talk about the crawl space.

Now, you

stated that you had to strap the plumbing up.
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Isn't that normally the plumber's job?

A

I don't know.

that had to be done.

It's one of the safety things
Somebody had to do it.

wasn't done by -- I don't know.

It

I wouldn't know whose
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responsibility that is.
Q

You talked about the dishwasher wouldn't

close properly.

Who did you purchase the dishwasher

from?
A

Sure Appliances.

Q

So wouldn't it have been their responsibility

to correct that problem?
A

I don't know.

that question.

I don't know the answer to

It had to be fixed.

all over the floor.

It was leaking

We couldn't run another load of

dishes without it being fixed.

Kim was able to spot

what was wrong and quickly fixed it, so it's kind of a
moot point.
Q

Isn't it true that the appliances were not a

part of the original contract?
A

That's right.

That's right.

Q

You talked about the landscaping, that you

had to dig a ditch -A

Yes.

Q

-- so that it wouldn't spash.

Isn't it true

that the landscaping was not a part of the original
contract?
A

That's true.

safety reasons.

But the ditch had to be dug for

That's one of the safety code reasons

because they wouldn't let that pass and us move into
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the house until we committed to do that because they
were scared of the rain splahing up and rotting the
foundation wall.
So that was more of a safety thing than
landscaping.
functional.

It wasn't esthetic.

It was actual

Any contractor should know about the

drainage of that house and what kind of water would
come off that and where it was going to go.
Q

Let's talk about the windows and the screens

that you put in.

Whose job is that normally to put

those in?
A

The windows were installed by the general

contractor.

I kind of assumed that the screens go

along with it.
Q

Did Mr. Steinfeldt tell you that if you

wanted him to put the screens in he would charge you
extra for that?
A

No, he did not.

Q

The doors in the garage that needed the

little metal -- I don't know what they're called -skins I think you called them.
A

Yes.

Q

Did you have the door company come in and put

those in?
A

Yes, I did.

I
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Q

The porch -- or that little log that

Mr. Cohen charged you $100 to think about, that's this
beam.

I don't want to write on your picture.

A

This beam and these two pieces.

Q

Did the original plans have them placed in

that position?
A

Yes.

Q

Or were they attached directly to the roof?

A

No, they were part of that position

underneath to show kind of a support system
underneath.
Q

I'm talking about the beam itself.

Was the

beam originally attached to the roof -- to be attached
to the roof?
A

That's the way Thad thought he should do it.

But after looking at it, he realized that wouldn't
look good, and it would mess up with the rain gutters.
So he said it can't be done that way.
Q

And did he tell you that it needed to be

attached up underneath the eaves like this is there?
A

No, this other guy figured that out.

it's for the esthetics.
Q

Again,

It's not for support.

You have these two invoices -- let me get the

originals here -- when you traded out some materials.
A

Yeah.
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leaving the job.
A

As I said, Thad did refuse to do that.

said, "I'm not going to mess with that thing."

He
So

Julie and I thought it was important to finish the
house the way the plans were, so we found somebody
else to do it.
Q

Do you have any knowledge of whether Thad

contacted any of the subcontractors on the 3rd or the
4th of November to
A

No.

Q

Excuse me.

—

Let me finish.

-- to tell them

they needed to come in and finish for the final
inspection?
A

No.

Q

Between the time you claim that Thad walked

off the job until the time you received the temporary
occupancy permit on the afternoon of the 5th, how much
work did you actually perform on the house?
A

I think I went through that whole list with

my attorney on that.

I went through every category.

A lot of it was physically myself moving the trash.
The actual physical things I did —

most of it was

running around town being an errand boy for the
electricians, making sure they had materials.
Julie was on the phone scheduling this, and
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we're coordinating on the cellular phone back and
forth trying to get everything coordinated and
everybody there at the right time.
I know I took two to three loads out to the
dump those two days, helped with putting the dirt on
the side of the retaining wall, and just assisted in
every one of those categories as we went through what
was listed.
Q

How much time did you spend?

A

In those two days I think Julie and -- the

both of us are claiming 48 hours which we think is a
very conservative estimate.
Q

I believe that's for the whole five days.

A

No, that's just for a couple days.

Q

For two days?

A

The next -- the following week I took the

whole week off from work, Monday through Friday,
getting all the loans and all the attorney and title
company stuff done.
Q

So what you just testified to, if I

understood you correctly, is that in two days you and
your wife spent -A

It would be Thursday, all day Thursday, all

day Friday, all day Saturday, and Monday.
is when we got the final inspection.

And Tuesday

So those five
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for the final inspection which is a lot more than 48
hours.
Q

Let me tell you.
Do you have any records to say what time you

spent on what job?
A

We didn't keep time cards.

If I had known

something was going to end up in court, I would have
kept a missionary journal.
time.

But we didn't know at the

And we've tried to document all the things we

did, as we've already gone through with my lawyer.
Q

And you testified just now that part of that

48 hours was spent on the 6th, which was Saturday?
A

Yes.

There were still things —

people -- we

still had subcontractors there on Saturday working.
Q

And you were also moving in at that time?

A

That's correct.

All the guys from work came

down and helped me move in.
Q

I missed one.

You talked about that Thad did

not clean up the job site.

Did he tell you that he

would charge you extra for cleaning up the job site?
A

He always had in the past, so I assumed it.

Q

He had always what?

A

Always charged us in the past for taking

trips to the dump.

But when I took my first load to

the dump, they only charged me $6.

And he was
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dash down to the recorder's office to file was to
cause problems to the Reeves.
I've used up my time.

I would just like to

say that in terms of being the prevailing party in
this action, both of his liens allege a contract that
the Court has already ruled is invalid, superseded
what we marked as Exhibit 1.
And we are the prevailing party.

We had to

litigate through that process in order to do that.
feel that we had to resolve this lien with him.
were required to by the title company.
indemnity agreement as well.

We

We

He signed the

We were required to get

that matter resolved.
He was never willing to consider his failures
and to compromise the matter on that basis; and,
therefore, my client should be considered the
successful or prevailing party in this.

And we submit

that we are entitled to judgment.
I have proposed findings and conclusions that
I'll submit to the Court at this time for whatever
assistance they may be to the Court in deliberating on
this matter.

And I'll conclude at least the main part

of my argument on that basis.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Jeffs.

MR. JEFFS:

Your Honor, we again renew our
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never given that information.
Also the plaintiffs could have complied with
the statute and paid and then sued for a refund in
order to fall within this statute, and they failed to
do that.
Defendant is entitled to his attorney fees in
this matter as a result of 38-1-18 and the foreclosure
of his lien.

He is also entitled to the cost in

interest from November 5th, 1993, until the date of
this judgment.
Mr. Steinfeldt was also required to file a
motion for summary judgment when the plaintiffs filed
under the wrong statute.

The Court has reserved its

ruling on the motion to dismiss on the issue of
attorney's fees, and we would request that you rule on
that also.
The defendant was also required to file a
motion to compel against the plaintiffs for failing to
answer discovery requests.

We would request that we

be entitled to our attorney's fees in that matter
also.

Thank you.
THE COURT:
MR. LAMBERT:

I'd

Anything else, Mr. Lambert?
Well, there's a lot of things

like to say, but I won't.

But let me say this,

the defendant wants to be paid just as though -- just
Vonda Bassett, RPR,
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, StaU of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Cn\lR^™ffi$f
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,
Plaintiffs,

' "cuputy

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 940400014
DATE: October 17, 1994
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING

vs.

THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT
CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling after a bench trial was conducted on
October 3, 1994. Both Plaintiffs and Defendant were present and represented by counsel.
The Court hereby rules as follows:
Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the amended contract which he entered into with
Plaintiffs. However, Defendant wrongfully filed a lien in excess of his rightful entitlement
and filed the lien too soon.

Under the contract Defendant was to be paid at the time of

closing, at the time Defendant filed the lien the monies were not yet due. Therefore, while
Defendant is entitled to the $10,000 under the contract, $300 weekly contractor's fee, and $20
per hour for any extras, any amount due him is subject to the following:
1. Defendant must remove the lien now on the property.
2. Defendant shall be responsible for the payment of the reasonable and necessary
attorney's fees which Plaintiff incurred in bringing this action.
3. Defendant shall be required to reimburse Plaintiffs for those expenses required to
complete the job which he was required to do under the contract. Specifically, Plaintiffs shall
be reimbursed for the 48 houi£ they spent in supervision and cleanup, at the rate of 20 per
hour.
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to $403.00 in interest for the monies they were forced to
escrow in this matter.
5. The payment of $140.00 to Kim Anderson by Plaintiffs shall be deducted from the
amount Defendant is due.

ooc

Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Judgment within 15 days of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for
signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 17th day of October, 1994.

cc:

D. David Lambert, Esq.
William M. Jeffs, Esq.
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WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 373-8848
Facsimile: 373-8878
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,

|

NOTICE OF APPEAL

i

Plaintiffs,

I
VS.

I
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant,

|
j

THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Counter Claimant,
vs.

SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Civil No. 940400014
Judge Ray M. Harding

Notice is hereby given that Thad B. Steinfeldt, dba Steinfeldt Construction, Defendant
and Counter Claimant/Appellant, by and through counsel William M. Jeffs appeals to the Utah
Supreme Court from the judgments and orders set forth below:
A.

Memorandum Decision of Judge Ray M. Harding dated October 17, 1994

B.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Judge Ray M.
Harding dated November 4, 1994

C.

Judgment of Judge Ray M. Harding dated November 4, 1994

D.

Memorandum Decision of Judge Ray M. Harding Denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 8,
1994.

^
n -4f

DATED AND SIGNED this h

(

day of December, 1994.

MA-

;W/

William M. Jeffs
Tl
Attorney for Defendant and
Counter Claimant/Appellant
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FILED IN
4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

95JAN 11 M M 31

D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), and
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,330

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,

NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant.

Case No. 94040CH4
Hon Ray M. Harding

THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Counter Claimant,
vs.
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N.
REEVES,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Shawn F. Reeves and Julie N. Reeves, plaintiff and
counterclaim defendants, by and through their counsel, D. David Lambert, cross appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court from the judgments and orders set forth below:
1.

Memorandum Decision of Judge Ray M. Harding, dated October 17, 1994;

2.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Judge Ray M. Harding, dated

November 4, 1994; and
3.

Judgment of Judge Ray M. Harding, dated November 4, 1994.

DATED this 11** day of January, 1995.

D. DAVID LAMBERT, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

Ii

day of January, 1995.

William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

J:\DDL\REEVES.NTC
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A

On the

Q

And have you then attempted to calculate the

15th.

interest differential between the amount that you had
financed on your construction loan at the construction
loan

rate compared to the same amount at the

long-term financing rate for those ten days that you
were delayed in closing?
A

Yes, we have.

And the one was a base plus

two, which would be six plus two was eight.
long-term was four and an eighth.
interest came to approximately
Q

And our

The eight days of

$403.

With respect to the cost of having to escrow

the money at Security Title Company, have you
attempted to calculate that based on Exhibit No. 20?
A

Yes, we have.

This was a little more

confusing because it's a variable rate signature loan,
and every month the rate can change.
anywhere from 12.9 to 13.9 to 14.6.

And it goes
Just taking an

average and estimating it, it came out to about
$1,842.20, the finance charges we've paid.
Q

Now, that's just what you paid to Security

Pacific; correct?
A
minimum.

Yes.

We made $330 payments each month, the

So some of that went to principal which made

it even less, and the rest went to principal too and
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
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On the 15th.

Q

And have you then attempted to calculate the

interest differential between the amount that you had
financed on your construction loan at the construction
loan

rate compared to the same amount at the

long-term financing rate for those ten days that you
were delayed in closing?
A

Y Q S , we have.

And the one was a base plus

two, which would be six plus two was eight.
long-term was four and an eighth.
interest came to approximately
Q

And our

The eight days of

$403.

With respect to the cost of having to escrow

the money at Security Title Company, have you
attempted to calculate that based on Exhibit No. 20?
A

Yes, we have.

This was a little more

confusing because it's a variable rate signature loan,
and every month the rate can change.
anywhere from 12.9 to 13.9 to 14.6.

And it goes
Just taking an

average and estimating it, it came out to about
$1,842.20, the finance charges we've paid.
Q

Now, that's just what you paid to Security

Pacific; correct?
A
minimum.

Yes.

We made $330 payments each month, the

So some of that went to principal which made

it even less, and the rest went to principal too and
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the cost of completing the work he had not performed?
A

Yes, I did.
MR. LAMBERT:

Those are all the questions I

have.
THE COURT:

You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q

When was your construction loan going to

expire?
A

The short-term?

Q

Uh-huh.

A

November 12th.

Q

November 12th.

Did you tell -- in the

meeting of November 3rd did you tell Mr. Steinfeldt
that you wanted the house to be completed by
November 5th?
A

That's when Thad said it would be scheduled.

We would have final inspection on Friday.

He would

take care of that.
Q

And when did you receive your temporary

occupancy?
A

That Friday afternoon at 4:15 when the

building inspector came by.

He said, "You guys have

taken care of all the safety problems.

Here go ahead

and start moving your luggage and your clothes.
Vonda Bassett, RPR,

(801) 429-1080

102
Tfm worth

1

I

said ,

2

p r o b a b l V" 1 o s i ng

3

a

1 of

$b0

mor P

an

h O U 1"

th a n

^20

an

i n ij

»I

hi'

n i> 1

hour

own

T

at

war,

wor k .

'llidL

1 -F

ra

work
i licit,

fc* u u i i e c i .

Let •~

O

dollars

p e l

a

1 quern

t ha t

He

cha r g e d

t h en

you

$300

week.

Yes.
y ou

And

M

hours

:

pe r

day,
That

1i

So

,!

were

five
s

days

1 „ „„y, ' .

q u i x UHJl
a

wee V

;

i

,s

I h a

n I I;

t,

*I

vn

correct?

correct.

tha t

works

Uh-hu h.

**

r e

out

to

aboil t

That•s where

$ 2 0' a n

came

we

up

hour.
with

t ha L

qurp .
!
You
.

w

.

J,

s

li

i V U

i l

Oil

r\ n

A

yuui

ere :

tlid, it- c o r r e c t ?
TIi a t ' s

correct.

1 lien

And

you

b ^ r r o * *n

<Si

A

n

*rom

your

Ificc.
A

r.nr^'pr't .

T

You r hus i ne s s •
iI

a 1lowed

j.

Il Il
~

You

nte

came

up w i t h

1 12 S 1 .

That • s
I

Exc u s e

~

Vonda

correct.
1
jet

"i j

on

dlaul

-r ' /

1

B a s s e t t , RPR,

rece

t

ve
w

(801)

K

:

w l

lor'liTTipnt

uecuixtj

429-1080

xi t i e .

103
What did you do with that money?
A

I paid it back to my company.

Q

Okay.

A

Since I wasn't charging any interest and I

was out the interest, I paid it back first.
Q

If you would have paid -- strike that.

If

Thad had agreed to take the $10,000 at the closing,
you would have still had to borrow the $10,000 from
your company in order to pay him; is that correct?
A

That's not correct.

Q

Where would you have received the $10,000?

A

It was in the long-term financing.

construction was $380,000.

Our

We had $448,000 prepared

for us in long term, so we had that extra money to pay
all the subs totally in full at closing.

He was

accounted for.
Q

Then shouldn't you have had $10,000 remaining

from the long-term financing because you didn't pay
him the $10,000; and, therefore, you should have still
received that $10,000 somewhere?
A

Well, I see what your point is there, but

there was some other miscellaneous bills and stuff
that came in too.

Kim Brezee wanted to be paid now

instead of waiting for the long-term.

And so there

had to be some things that were from left hand to
Vonda Bassett, RPR,

(801) 429-1080
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the

job?
A

N o , he did not.

T h e r e w e r e no

draws

submitted.
MR. L A M B E R T :

Those

are all the q u e s t i o n s I

have of this f i t n e s s .
MR. J E F F S :

Nothing

THE C O U R T :

Very w e l l .

MR. L A M B E R T :

f u r t h e r , your

Honor.

You may step down.

Your H o n o r , at this time

I'll

call Mr. R e e v e s .
THE C O U R T :

All r i g h t .

If y o u ' l l

come

forward, p l e a s e , raise your r i g h t h a n d , the clerk

will

administer the oath to y o u .
SHAWN F.
called

REEVES

as a w i t n e s s h e r e i n , h a v i n g been

sworn, was examined
THE COURT:

and t e s t i f i e d

Be seated

duly

as f o l l o w s :

in the w i t n e s s

chair,

please.
DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. L A M B E R T :
Q

M r . R e e v e s , will y o u p l e a s e

state your

full

name.
A

Shawn Farrell R e e v e s .

Q

And where do you

A

53 West 650 North

Q

And you are married

reside?
in L i n d o n , U t a h .

Vonda B a s s e t t , R P R ,

to J u l i e R e e v e s who
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the cost of completing the work he had not performed?
A

Yes, I did.
MR. LAMBERT:

Those are all the questions I

have.
THE COURT:

You may cro^s-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q

When was your construction loan going to

expire?
A

The short-term?

Q

Uh-huh.

A

November 12th.

Q

November 12th.

Did you tell -- in the

meeting of November 3rd did you tell Mr. Steinfeldt
that you wanted the house to be completed by
November 5th?
A

That's when Thad said it would be scheduled.

We would have final inspection on Friday.

He would

take care of that.
Q

And when did you receive your temporary

occupancy?
A

That Friday afternoon at 4:15 when the

building inspector came by.

He said, "You guys have

taken care of all the safety problems.

Here go ahead

and start moving your luggage and your clothes.
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What did you do with that money?
A

I paid it back to my company.

Q

Okay.

A

Since I wasn't charging any interest and I

was out the interest, I paid it back first.
Q

If you would have paid -- strike that.

If

Thad had agreed to take the $10,000 at' the closing,
you would have still had to borrow the $10,000 from
your company in order to pay him; is that correct?
A

That f s not correct.

Q

Where would you have received the $10,000?

A

It was in the long-term financing.

construction was $380,000.

Our

We had $448,000 prepared

for us in long term, so we had that extra money to pay
all the subs totally in full at closing.

He was

accounted for.
Q

Then shouldn't you have had $10,000 remaining

from the long-term financing because you didn't pay
him the $10,000; and, therefore, you should have still
received that $10,000 somewhere?
A

Well, I see what your point is there, but

there was some other miscellaneous bills and stuff
that came in too.

Kim Brezee wanted to be paid now

instead of waiting for the long-term.

And so there

had to be some things that were from left hand to
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080
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lU^i

right hand.
And Julie and I were virtually paying out of
pocket -- had prepaid some subs out of our own funds,
and we were going to be reimbursed on the long-term
financing.

So some of the moneys might have gone to

reimburse Julie and I for money we had previously paid
out of our own pocket.
There were funds there for Thad to be paid
$10,000 plus any other miscellaneous bills he wanted
to turn in at closing.

Of course, he didn f t turn

those bills into us until after he placed the lien on
the home.
Q

Didn't he send you a copy of his bill on the

A

That's when it was postmarked.

Q

Had you paid Thad the $20 per hour prior to

6th?

October 9th when would he have submitted the bill to
you?
A

For what?

Q

For any extra work.

A

There wasn't any extra work.

Q

How much did you tell Thad he would be paid

at the closing?
A

Per our contract $10,000 at closing, you

know, when the house was closed and he finished it.
Vonda Bassett, RPR,

(801) 429-1080
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Addendum 22

PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT
CREDITOR (Name Address)

SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100
AURORA.CO 80011
PHONEt 800-274-6711
ACCOUNT NUMBER

$16,500
•

$0.00
-

PAST OOE AMOUNT

AVAILABLE CREDIT

17060770
PREVIOUS BALANCE

3861

CASH ADVANCES

*

INSURANCE CHARGES

$16,500.00
-

PAYMENTS

$0 00

12/03/93

$0
•

OTHER CHARGES

-

$0.00

•

$0.00

FINANCE CHARGE

$0.00

$0.00

CREDITS

01/03/94
$114.67

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(f*CLUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT)

NEW BALANCE

$^30.00

$16,614.67

TRANSACTION PESCWTtON

CASH ADVANCE - CHECK

11/16/93

$16,500.00

206

THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT,
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY.
MONTHLY
XANNUAl*
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1.158K

$9,900.00

ALL

13.90X

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE

AA

THERE IS NO OATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT
CREDITOR (Name

Address)

SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100
AURORA,CO 80011
PHONE. 800-274-6711
ACCOUNT NUMBER

CREDIT LIMIT

17060770

$16,500

PREVIOUS BALANCE

AVAILABLE CREDIT

$0

_CASH ADVANCES

OUE_OATE

02/03/94

PAST DUE AMOUNT

$330.00

FINANCE CHARGE

$177.37

$0.00

$0.00
•

BILLING DATE

01/03/94
OTHER CHARGES

^WSURANCE CHARGES

$0.00

$16,614.67

3861

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCLUDES PAST QUE AMOUNT)

NEW BALANCE

$16,792.04

$660.00

TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION

THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY.
MONTHLY
XANNUAL*
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1.075*

12.90*

ALL

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE
$16,500.00

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM
AA

THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH OR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PAYMENT MAY BE MAOE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIOE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

m/vf

c

£.nu

«vc

D I E

IUU

AURORA,CO
80011
PHONE. 8 0 0 - 2 7 4 - 6 7 1 1
CRECXT LIM T

ACCOUNT NUMBER

PREVIOUS BALANCE

AVAILABLE CREDIT

BILLING DATE

DUE DATE

$1,165

06/03/94

07/03/94

$16,500

17060770
•

CASH ADVANCES

INSURANCE CHARGES

$0 00

$15 819 59
PAYMENTS

OTHER CHARGES

-

NEW BALANCE

y^

TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION

PAYMENT - THANK YOU
PAYMENT - THANK YOU

05/04/94
05/25/94

$174 92

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCIUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT)

$15,334 51

$0 00

$0 00

FINANCE CHARGE

$0 00

$0 00

CREDITS

$660 00

•

PAST DUE AMOUNT

$330 00$330 00-

YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE CREDIT LINE IS THE^PERFECT CHOICE
WHENEVER YOU NEED EXTRA CASH
THERE ARE NEVER ANY HIDDEN
FEES. AND YOU'LL ENJOY A LOW INTEREST RATE AND LOW MONTHLY
PAYMENTS
YOU HAVE $200 00 AVAILABLE, SO USE YOUR LINE
OR CALL US FOR A CASH ADVANCE TODAY

THE BALANCE S H O W N IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU W I S H TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT
CALL THE N U M B E R S H O W N O N THIS STATEMENT

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY
MONTHLY
XANNUAL*
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1 138X

13 65X

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM

$15,377 41

ALL

THERE IS N O OATE BY WHICH O R PERIOO WITHIN W H I C H PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION
002A&4R
PLEASE R E T U R N TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT
CREDITOR (Name

Address)

SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100
AURORA,CO 80011
PHONE 800-274-6711
CREDIT LIMIT

ACCOUNT NUMBER

17060770
PREVIOUS BALANCE

$15,034

3861

AVAILABLE CREDIT

$18,000

BILLING OATE

$3,114

CASH AOVANCES

•

INSURANCE CHARGES

39

09/03/94
•

OTHER CHARGES

$0 00

$0 00

FINANCE CHARGE

$0 00

$0 00
-

PAST DUE AMOUNT

10/03/94
$180 80

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCLUOESPAST DUE AMOUNT)

NEW BALANCE

$14,885 19

$330 00

TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION

08/26/94

PAYMENT - THANK YOU

$330 00-

BEGINNING NOVEMBER 14, 1994, THE REPAYMENT TERMS FOR YOUR
ACCOUNT WILL BE CHANGED
YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENT WILL REDUCE AS
YOUR BALANCE DECLINES
YOU HAVE THE OPTION OF MAKING PAYMENTS
BASED UPON THIS METHOD OR YOU CAN PAY MORE THAN THE SCHEDULED
AMOUNT - THERE IS NO PREPAYMENT PENALTY ON YOUR ACCOUNT
THERE IS A MINIMUM PAYMENT AMOUNT OF $70 00
IF YOU HAVE ANY
QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL 1-800-274-6711 AND OUR CUSTOMER SERVICE
REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE HAPPY TO ASSIST YOU

THE BALANCE S H O W N IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU W I S H TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT
CALL THE NUMBER S H O W N O N THIS STATEMENT

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY
MONTHLY
XANNUALX
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1 221/

14 65/

ALL

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE
$14,809 43

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM
AA

THERE IS N O DATE BY WHICH OR PERIOO WITHIN W H I C H PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOIO ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION
7002 B93R

14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100
AURORA,CO 80011
PHONEi 800-274-6711
AVAILABLE CREDIT

ACCOUNT NUMBER

17060770

CASH ADVANCES

PREVIOUS BALANCE

PAST DUE AMOUNT

$16,500

$16,500
•

11/03/93

INSURANCE CHARGES

•

12/03/93

OTHER CHARGES

$0.00

FINANCE CHARGE

$0.00

$0.00

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCLUDESPAST QUE AMOUNT)

NEW BALANCE

$0.00
THANSACTION DESCRIPTION

MAKE HOLIDAY SHOPPING EASY WITH YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE CREDIT
LINE. YOUR EXCELLENT PAYMENT RECORD MEANS YOU HAVE
$16,500.00 AVAILABLE FOR ALL YOUR HOLIDAY PURCHASES — A N D
YOU'LL ENJOY A LOW INTEREST RATE AND LOW MONTHLY PAYMENTS.
JUST WRITE A CHECK FROM YOUR ACCOUNT CHECKBOOK.

THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY.
RANGE
MONTHLY
XANNUAL*
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1.158*

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE

ALL

13.90*

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM

$0.00

AA

THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH, PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION
(2 893

PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT
CREDITOR (Name Address)

SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 '
AURORA,CO 80011
PHONE. 800-274-6711
ACCOUNT NUMBER

17060770
PREVIOUS BALANCE

CREDIT LIMIT

$16,500

3861

AVAILABLE CREDIT

8ILLINO OATE

$518

CASH ADVANCES • INSURANCE, CHARGES * OTHER CHARGES

^16,308.22

$0.00

$500.00

$0.00

PAST DUE AMOUNT

03/03/94

$0.00

04/03/94
•

FINANCE CHARGE

$0.00

$172.92

> NEW BALANCE

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCLUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT)

$15,981.14

$330.00

TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION

02/28/94

PAYMENT - THANK YOU

$500.00-

YES, THERE IS AN EASY WAY TO PAY TAXES — JUST USE YOUR
PRIVATE RESERVE CREDIT LINE CHECKBOOK. YOU HAVE THE AMOUNT
LISTED ABOVE AVAILABLE ~ AND THE LOW INTEREST RATE AND LOW
MONTHLY PAYMENTS MAKE PRIVATE RESERVE A GREAT WAY TO BEAT THE
TAX-TIME BLUES. USE YOUR LINE TODAY.

4 if
^

THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT

YOUR PERIODIC RATECS) MAY VARY.
MONTHLY
XANNUALX
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1.075X

12.90*

ALL

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE
$16,085.78

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM
AA

THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

PHONE:

800-274-6711

ACCOUNT NUMBER

CREDIT LIMIT

17060770

$16,500

PREVIOUS BALANCE

•

BILLING D»TE

DUE DATE

05/03/94

06/03/94

AVAILABLE CREDIT

$680

CASH ADVANCES

.

INSURANCE CHARGES *

OTHER CHARGES

•

P AST DUE A

$33i

FINANCE CHARGE

$0.00

§15,649.94

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCLUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT)

NEW BALANCE

$0.00

$15,819.59

$660.00

TRANSACTION OeSCWPTON

RELAX — YOU HAVE $100.00 AVAILABLE TO YOU RIGHT NOW.
JUST USE YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE ACCOUNT FOR WEDDINGS,
GRADUATIONS, VACATIONS OR ANY PERSONAL REASON. USE YOUR
CHECKBOOK, OR CALL 1-800-274-6711 TOBAY.

w

T H E BALANCE S H O W N IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE. IF YOU W I S H TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT.
CALL THE NUMBER S H O W N O N THIS STATEMENT.

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY.
MONTHLY
XANNUAL*
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
B/ ANCES
1.096%

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE
$15,481.14

ALL

13.155J

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM

THERE IS NO DATE BY W H I C H . OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE C H A R G E S .
NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT
CREDITOR (Name. Address)

SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100
AURORA,CO 80011
PHONE. 800-274-6711
ACCOUNT NUMBER

17060770
PREVIOUS BALANCE

CREDIT LIMIT

AVAILABLE CREDIT

$18,000
•

08/03/94

INSURANCE CHARGES •

$0.00

OTHER CHARGES

$0.00

$0.00

OATE

09/03/94
•

$0.00

FINANCE CHARGE

$0.00

. NEW BALANCE

$330.00

PAST DUE AMOUNT

DUE OATE

$2,965

CASH AOVANCES

$15,182.41

3861

$181.98

MINIMUM PAYMENT
(INCLUDES PAST DUE AMOUNT)

$15,034.39

$330.00

TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION

07/15/94

PAYMENT - THANK YOU

$330.00-

YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE ACCOUNT GIVES YOU A CONSISTENTLY LOW
INTEREST RATE — WITH NO ANNUAL FEES OR CASH ADVANCE CHARGES.
THAT MAKES YOUR ACCOUNT THE PERFECT CHOICE FOR BILL
CONSOLIDATION OR ANY PERSONAL REASON. JUST USE YOUR CHECKBOOK
OR CALL US AT 1-800-274-6711.

THE BALANCE S H O W N IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE. IF Y O U W I S H TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT.
CALL THE NUMBER S H O W N O N THIS STATEMENT.

YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY.
MONTHLY
XANNUALX
RANGE
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX
OF
RATE
XRATEX
BALANCES
1.221*

14.65*

ALL

FINANCE CHARGE
COMPUTED ON
THIS BALANCE
$14,906.38

SEE EXPLANATION
ON REVERSE SIDE
OF THIS FORM
AA

THERE IS N O DATE BY W H I C H . OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE T O AVOIO ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES
NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

